SMALL WARS LEAD TO BIG WARS

By Omar Locatelli

03

THE CONCEPT OF VICTORY IN THE 21ST CENTURY WARS
By Guillermo Horacio Lafferriere

24

THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY KNOWLEDGE
By Miguel Podestá

35

OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS AND THE LIMITS OF THE CAMPAIGN
By Leonardo Arcadio Zarza
Our icon is the famous Rubik’s cube decorated with the colours of the Argentine flag and the coat of arms that identifies the Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas. We have elected this ingenious mechanism for our journal as it is the visual representation of the complex joint actions.

The image shows the challenge to combine in a harmonic way the elements that are part of the Armed Forces to achieve an efficient use of military instruments.

The proper use of the forces allows to set, at the same level, the coat of arms of the Estado Mayor Conjunto which implies a mental process to combine variables in a very complex setting.

In order to be successful as to the situation raised, it is necessary to have a broad mindset that allows to have a general perception of the target to be achieved; this defines our “joint perspective”.

---

**STAFF**

**DIRECTOR**
Colonel Major Federico Sidders

**SUBDIRECTOR**
Daniel Oscar Muñoz

**COMITÉ EDITORIAL**
Jorge Mazorra Mariño
Juan Adrián Campitelli
Marcelo Eduardo Giunta
José Salvador Colombati
Ricardo Mario Pavicic

**COMITÉ DE REFERATO**
Dr. Antonio Adrián Arciénaga Morales
Dr. Julio Horacio Rubé
Coronel Gabriel Camilli
Magíster Pablo Bereciartua
Magíster Fabián Calle
Magíster Enrique Clavier
Licenciada Susana Carranza
Licenciada Adolfo Koutoudjian
Licenciada Fabián Lavallen Ranea

**SECRETARIO DE REDACCIÓN**
Pedro Jofré

**TEXTOS EN INGLÉS**
Trad. Públ. Mariana Ríos Hudson

**EDITORES Y PROPIETARIO**
Escuela Superior de Guerra Conjunta de las Fuerzas Armadas

Registro de Propiedad Intelectual en trámite
Domicilio: Av. Luis María Campos 480, 2° piso C1426BOP, CABA
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>STRATEGY</td>
<td>MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>COVER ARTICLE</td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>STRATEGY</td>
<td>THE CONCEPT OF VICTORY IN THE 21ST CENTURY WARS</td>
<td>Guillermo Horacio Lafferriere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>STRATEGY</td>
<td>CULMINATING POINT AND DESIRED END STATE</td>
<td>Jorge Paulo Barrales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>STRATEGY</td>
<td>NEGENTROPY</td>
<td>Jorge Eduardo Lenard Vives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>HOMAGE</td>
<td>HOMAGE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>HOMAGE</td>
<td>GENERAL DON JOSÉ DE SAN MARTÍN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>LEADERSHIP</td>
<td>LEADERSHIP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>LEADERSHIP</td>
<td>THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY KNOWLEDGE</td>
<td>Miguel Podestá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>LOGISTICS</td>
<td>LOGISTICS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>LOGISTICS</td>
<td>OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS AND THE LIMITS OF THE CAMPAIGN</td>
<td>Leonardo Arcadio Zarza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS</td>
<td>SMALL WARS LEAD TO BIG WARS</td>
<td>Omar Locatelli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL LAW</td>
<td>HUMAN RESOURCES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL LAW</td>
<td>THE ART OF NEGOTIATION</td>
<td>Julián Ernesto Sccasso Losa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL LAW</td>
<td>PROTOCOL ON EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR</td>
<td>Carlos Nielsen Enemark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVITIES</td>
<td>INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVITIES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Almost a year ago, we have opened the Centro Educativo de las Fuerzas Armadas. During this period, the expectations we exposed at that time have become materialized.

The curriculum adaptation of the specific aspects to the joint ones and its physical representation in sharing what each higher studies institution of each force has.

This is an action under development which allows for concept reunification that will turn into action as to optimization of coordination between the three forces.

The most important aspect of sharing is interaction, the experience of feeling the specific aspects and thinking and acting in a joint manner. The better the academic performance is at specific schools, the more intellectual goals they can achieve when acting jointly, making the most of the opportunities the Escuela Superior de Guerra Conjunta has.

The final result will, of course, be a growing professionalization of our armed forces in which each of us will acknowledge the other forces as ours and the three of them together will finally materialize the articulation of the military instrument which allows to respond to the Nation’s demands.

The integration of the region countries through the education thread made the participation of MERCOSUR and UNASUR officers possible as students of the master in joint strategy and higher direction. This is part of the answer to the need of coordinating the military instruments of the region.

The call by CONEAU for the final accreditation of the master in joint strategy and higher direction and the specialization in operation strategy and joint military planning has posed us a challenge which we took by stating our decision to respond to that call in April, 2014.

This decision shows our commitment with academic accuracy in search for excellence in the education offer and encourages members of the institution to focus on this purpose and to consolidate goals achieved.

Colonel Major Federico Sidders
Director of the Escuela Superior de Guerra Conjunta de las Fuerzas Armadas
THE CONCEPT OF VICTORY IN THE 21ST CENTURY WARS

An approach to the concept of “hybrid” in modern wars

In this article, we analyze whether the concept of military victory in this 21st century can be considered a current idea, by defining the aspects of current wars. It aims at the need to limit the expectations as to achieving the goals set exclusively by the political power by means of military resources and encourages a multidisciplinary approach to address the complex dynamics that war presented during the first decades of this century.

**INTRODUCTION**

Victory was not a wrong concept for the Duke of Wellington when during the afternoon of June 18, 1815, near a place in Belgium known as Waterloo, he saw Prussian troops appearing to the left of his device; and when the Old Guard of Napoleon gave in some land, he ordered all his army to move towards the French army which, in his view, was breaking up in light of the merciless action that allied troops exercised over them. This victory was both tactic and strategic. The first because, undoubtedly, troops of the “Monster of Europe” were not even in conditions to withdraw in order to try a new battle. And it was strategic because the result of the battle put an end to the restoration dream of Napoleon as master of Europe.

This example, given by Military History, is one that we think can be found at the moment when the “Kaiser Offense” failed in 1918 allowing the allies to defeat the German Empire and to put an end to the First World War or, some decades after.

---

1. Keegan, John; *The face of battle*; Penguins Books; New York, United States of America; 1978.
later, when the Soviet Army took contact, in 1945, with the allies on the Elba River definitely closing the crazy dream of a “thousand-year Reich”.

However, after 1945, there were very few occasions in which we can find military victories that have meant the end of a battle.

Rather, in our opinion, many times, victories in the field of battle have allowed to sustain a strategic situation. This is the case of the several victories of Israel against the different Arab states which allowed to preserve the State of Israel. However, they have not been able to reach the peace that helps them get rid of the need to have a high enlistment level of its military instrument to preserve the existence of Israel.

Or, rather, victories in the tactic field that do not have an impact on the strategic one and, therefore, as we have mentioned, they cannot change the political situation that led to war.

This appears clearly in the allied withdrawal from Iraq after almost a decade of military actions and changing political purposes for that intervention. The following withdrawal from Afghanistan, in 2014, in which, in spite of a fluctuating military effort which was massive during the last years, we can foresee that once allies have withdrawn, Talibans, who by action or omission and who made it possible for Al-Qaeda to have a sanctuary from which they could threat and attack the West, would certainly be a menacing power factor in this country.

We believe it is necessary, in light of this situation, to rethink the idea that military professionals have of victory and that have a direct impact over political power as well, because both stages interact at the moment of deciding to reach goals of high political importance through the use of the military resources.

WHAT IS BEHIND THE INCAPACITY TO GET A STRATEGIC MILITARY VICTORY?

We consider there have been some changes in the environment in which war develops, which poses the question of this part of the article.

With the appearance of what we call asymmetric war and with the decolonization process known as uprising, the paradigm upon which wars were developing changed significantly.

Until this situation, war was an activity that military forces carried out in a greater or smaller quality, confronting in spaces and times in which, in its interaction, sought to cause enough damage to the enemy so that they could impose their own will.

This process could take more or less time, depending on the skills of each of the sides that are confronted but, in general, it led to the victory of one of them or, as in the case of the Korea War, to a ceasefire that has extended with different characteristics up to these days.

This is no longer the prevalent situation and it has been replaced with an operational environment that is more difficult to define and that, in the Anglo-Saxon world, is known as hybrid environment.

DESCRIPTION OF “HYBRID” CHARACTERISTICS

> Sides in struggle

These can be, at an initial stage, what we traditionally know as regular forces and, over time, one of them may become an irregular force as they see that they cannot fight the battle by means of a classic battle.

The clearest example is Iraq in 2003 when allied troops invaded the country and, after the defeat of Iraqi forces, a quasi-multinational insurgence took arms and started a battle against allied troops for almost a decade and it is, today, the one that acts against the Iraqi government after the allied withdrew from the country in mass.

There might also be the case that a regular force confronts with an insurgent force from the beginning and which eventually becomes a force of regular characteristics as it acquires skills trying to act as the latter does.

The Libyan case and, in particular, the current case of Syria seem to adapt to the description.

However, the change mentioned does not generally make these irregular forces which turned into regular to leave some of the “vices” that irregular forces normally have.

Thus, actions that do not depend on regular orders, elimination of prisoners and encouragement of terrorist actions still have an important presence in actions under development.
This clearly shows the difficulties posed by the creation of any regular force, that is, one with a discipline level that the exercise of violence, hard as it might be, will always be supported by commands clearly established, so the traceability criteria may be applied to any of the actions carried out. This is difficult to find in irregular troops and in those that change to become regular ones, at least for long periods of time.

Ubiquitous media
In the work “Relaciones prensa-FF.AA. en ocasión de desarrollarse operaciones militares”, the difficult relation between troops in operations and the media in any conflict is broadly dealt with.

Possibilities that technology has provided with to the media and the economic power of great chains give them the chance to be in any place on the battlefield. And, although higher commands can, and in fact, do, establish restrictive measures to the presence of the media, their own troops, making use of their personal media and, in some cases, of the media they are provided with, have the capacity to release information at any time in social networks.

This capacity may cause that facts, which in the past were dealt with almost exclusively by military men can today be known immediately by someone who is a thousand kilometers away from the place of the action and spread “like a virus” on the Internet.

Thus, actions that could before be considered as mistakes of an action in times of war, have the capacity to become “atrocities”. These may be understood by the local and international public as part of a wrong conception of war direction and, therefore, have a strategic impact on its development.

There are many examples of these issues and they show, on their own, the complexity level in which war can occur.

Presence of local and international Non-Governmental Organizations
They will act in any place they can. Sometimes, in the...
places where sides confront; some other times, in areas of rearguard and rest and, most of the times, in the places where civilians search for shelter.

Their control will be as difficult as the control of the media and, also, because of their action and capacity to reach the international community, they will act as a sounding board of actions that troops of either side may carry out.

Lack of consideration of this aspect, an attempt to limit them without any reason or the lack of search for modes to facilitate their action may directly lead to disaster for the command that addresses their relation with them.

Radical Change of the Combat Paradigm

Until the appearance of the hybrid phenomenon of war, the battlefield was divided into two different areas.

One of them was the area of combat. Here, the fight was against the enemy and the main concern was to develop operations that would cause the greatest possible damage so that they could soon impose their will.

The second area was known as communications zone. This is located in the rear of the first one, advanced straight ahead as there was progress in the area where combat took place. In this communications area, priorities were related to sustaining troops in terms of logistics in the combat area and, to a lesser extent, to encourage the feasible improvement of living conditions of the civil population that was there.

Today, war does not clearly distinguish those areas and, in practice, it sometimes happens that there is combat in both of them. The need to help civil population is not restricted to a certain sector but it is stated in the agenda of higher commands.

Thus, there will be a commander who will not only need to plan and develop combat operations but will, at the same time, be obliged to carry out some others in order to sustain civil population, rebuild facilities for the latter and even deal with complex political situations that arise from the relations of the population with their authorities.

This, in its own, will require an effort that has not been

---

7. Johnson, David E.; Military capabilities for hybrid war; Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, United States of America; 2010: “Israel’s experience in “hybrid” battlefields may help to understand its complexity.”
duly measured by us, but which is under permanent analysis in other countries that have directly suffered because of the changing nature that war has acquired today.

Little or zero tolerance for own losses and rejection of collateral damage
La brutalidad de la guerra ya no es un hecho desconocido por The brutality of war is not unknown to the public, but it is easily available to anyone who desires to look into these topics in the diversity of media that the current civilization puts at the disposal of any person with access to the Internet. This, together with the change in cultural standards, has made it possible not to accept significant losses in the troops during the development of military operations.

In this way, there is a challenge for political and military leaders because, if taken to the extreme, these criteria may make it difficult to reach certain military goals.

On the other hand, it acts as a moderator of actions as it leads to less freedom to carry out operations that do not have the proper planning level for their operational development.

Likewise, it was traditionally understood that undesired losses among civilians could exist in any war; this is called collateral damage and it results from the difficulties that operations often impose on their development.

However, criteria similar to the own losses apply to this and, today, it is very difficult for any military organization to counteract the release of pictures of civil casualties or injured although from a cold military point of view, these are smaller when compared to the goal achieved.

Little chance to start a decisive battle
There seems to be a trend not to exist decisive combats, as it was common during the 20th century wars.

Probably, many of the characteristics mentioned in this essay have helped one of the sides not to start the battle.

This situation will make it possible for some of these alternatives to exist:

- One of the sides may try to force the other one to start the battle, which will hardly occur if the latter has the freedom of action that allows to avoid this situation, at least until they consider the chance to successfully carry it out.
- For long periods of time, which in practice may be indefinite, there is a situation in which sides in conflict only affect each other and, therefore, the military situation as to who is able to impose themselves over the other one does not change.

This situation may last as much as the direction political will of each of them may sustain this effort in front of their own public opinion or, rather, the real power factors that sustain their political legitimacy.

This is complex inasmuch as in the situation described, there will be no clear parameters to show in front of the very population that there is some progress that allows to see a favorable result for the force.

Expectations from the military situation
In light of this particular scenario, it is clear that waiting for a solution through the use of the military force may lead to failure. This does not mean that the military resource has to be ignored. Not at all.

What we think is that this must be used together with other simultaneous actions that military commanders must carry out with state civil organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, multilateral and even private organizations8, which have purposes and skills very different from the military ones. However, they must be integrated to create together with the military resource the synergy that allows

But this complex, and why not, perplexing situation for the classical analysis of war has its counterpart.

8. These private organizations may be very different. Some of them will provide armed services of different nature, such as the emblematic Blackwater. Others may have philanthropic purposes and there are also some others that operate recognition satellites that, in real time, could cover the area where they operate, using the information obtained to support different causes, which do not always coincide with the ones of the forces in conflict.
to change the situation that led to the idea of using violence to solve it.

In this idea, there will not be an exclusive search for a successful action on the battlefield or a series of violent actions of great importance that will gradually lead to break the fighting will of the enemy, but for a favorable situation for the direction that justifies the great effort made and creates a general positive stability status for the future.

It may seem that this raises some needs only to higher commands in charge of military operations, that is, the Commander of the Theater of Operations, presented by the Executive Power with the responsibility to develop the campaign, as our doctrine states.

On the contrary, we consider that the need to create the synergy we mentioned goes through all direction levels and must be sought and articulated from the higher to the lower level.

There are no lower level decisions that have effects on their narrow area of influence, but the interaction of actors that we have listed makes it impossible for a command to avoid the responsibility the situation imposes.

But this complex, and why not, perplexing situation for the classical analysis of war has its counterpart. It does not operate as a condition for one of the sides in conflict, but it operates in a similar way for both of them.

This acts as a “leveler of forces” because the mere fact of having a greater military capacity does not guarantee a successful situation.

A group that has reasons to justify its actions, that has the capacity to make them be understood by a great part of the international community, that simultaneously shows an articulation with actors that will be present in the conflict and that takes advantage of its relation with the civil population involved in it in a smart way will be able to reach a superior freedom of action before an adversary that cannot create this virtuous relation. This aspect will make them lose initiative (freedom of action is always the result of a zero-sum game) and will clearly be on the defensive in the strategic aspect.

The impact caused by our statements, especially in the capacity to “level-off forces” that arises from the characteristics of the 21st century wars, should, in our opinion, be an incentive for the necessary strategy to create forces of any military instrument.

Ideas such as training quality, high individual discipline, leadership capacity and the availability of lethal and non-lethal quality elements and a certain ability to quickly show force are at the front of the list of requirements to be met by any military force. This is over guidelines such as the ones that establish the idea of mass armies with unlimited resources and willing to be gradually pawned according to 19th century mobilization concepts.

**With the appearance of what we call asymmetric war and with the decolonization process known as uprising, the paradigm upon which wars were developing changed significantly.**

### A VISION TO THE FUTURE

Our vast experience in Peacemaking Operations and the different scenarios in which our forces are operating have forced them to interact in a very close way to the one that will be required by any military action in the 21st century.

This capacity should be assessed and put into perspective with the information obtained from military commitments that have taken place and will take place with the purpose of acquiring the greatest possible experience.

We think it is essential for these experiences to be internalized when training troops trying not to make them be only skills acquired by contingents abroad. This will make the military instrument acquire certain skills for actions with concrete possibilities of reaching the effects required by the political power if used for military actions.

War is under constant change. It sometimes changes slowly causing the feeling that unchanging situations have been reached.

Some other times, it changes in a quick way leading the doctrine used by military forces to support an operation to crisis.

We are currently going through an accelerated mutation phase that has led to intense discussions about the way to fight and solve complexities presented by the phenomenon in several nations.

This hybrid characteristic will probably affect us for a long period of time requiring military forces to develop multiple skills, which are sometimes contradictory, but always challenging for the reaching of purposes set.

The lack of understanding of the environment in which war is being developed will present an important coincidence with what has normally been constant for the military forces of many nations: they preferred to get ready for the war scenario that better adapted to “their vision” of war.

This mistake is, in no few cases, paid with defeat.

Understanding war and its trends is key to any military instrument that aims at being a useful element for the country it serves.

> Refered Article

---

**Strategy**

With the appearance of what we call asymmetric war and with the decolonization process known as uprising, the paradigm upon which wars were developing changed significantly.
In the newspaper La Gaceta de Buenos Aires published on March 13, 1812, the writer-Bernardo Monteagudo- wrote these words that, without knowing it, would become prophetic.

I, influenced by different feelings, have wondered many times: what will the future of my homeland be? Who will take the flag of its freedom?

The same newspaper, in its last page, stated: On 9th of this month, the English frigate Jorge Caning arrived from London...; to this port, among others, the Cavalry Lieutenant Colonel José de San Martín, first field assistant of the General in Chief of the Army of the Compigny Marques Island, continuing, afterwards, with the detail of the distinguished passengers.

On August 17, it was the 163rd anniversary of the death of General José de San Martín, Father of this Homeland, General Captain of Chile and Founder of Peru’s freedom.

He was one of the most important strategists in history, he used his intelligence and skills as military driver at the service of the land on which he was born to reach and ensure its freedom. This was his obsession, the goal he pursued and to which he devoted his efforts and for which he left some things aside; the one that would be reflected in the message delivered to his men: Let’s be free, nothing else matters.

He could learn that big companies cannot be created with just words and ideas, it is necessary to have passion and intelligence that will lead to action. Thanks to these conditions, he became one of the most important leaders of his times.

He formed an army with no elements, with this army, which was both force and school, he crossed one of the highest mountains in the world, being able to start the decisive battle of Chacabuco with a strategic move that was surprising due to its intelligent conception and perfect conduction.

1. Student of the Master in Joint Strategy and Higher Direction of the Escuela Superior de Guerra Conjunta
His name belongs to the history that mentions him among the Great Captains in the world. His work has been magnified and perpetuated through the growth and prosperity of the peoples he could free.

During the development of nations, we must highlight that apart from having been able to free half the Americas, General San Martín is the foundational stone of our national being. The great production of his intelligence was no more fruitful and overwhelming than the invincible strength of their virtues. Thus, remembering his life is to give value to the rich and valuable heritage he transmitted to us.

He was not a conqueror of nations, but a liberator of peoples.

He did not want men who were subjugated because of their ignorance, but free peoples saved by education.

After having reached the supreme power in Peru, he left it when he understood that his service was over.

And, in particular, because throughout his public and private life, he primarily focused on the defense of the interests of the Homeland, even during his definite exile showing his skills and discipline not to fail nor have vain resentment in case of defamation and false accusations.

The love to the Homeland, his lack of interest in material goods and personal honors, his vocation of service and, particularly, his relinquishment and irreproachable ethics cause admiration and commitment in those who received his legacy.

Admiration because he is the best summary of the spirit of the first times, the times of a heroic and sacrificed Argentina where inhabitants were willing to fight for freedom and the creation of a better future for them and the coming generations.

Commitment because he left an ethic mandate that must rule our behavior; because he taught us that it is possible to dream and materialize a country project based on national unit.

General José de San Martín, thanks to his strong vocation, will, sacrifice and devotion achieved his goal of being what he had to be rather than nothing.

When remembering the death of the person who is the greatest hero of our Homeland, I pray to the Virgin of Carmen de Cuyo, mother and general of the Army of the Andes, as the Liberator did when he crossed the Andean mountains, to protect and guide those of us who are today part of the Armed Forces of our Nation and to let us invoke the virtues of the Great Captain so that we can take and materialize them at the moment and in the place where we are the main players in the history of our Argentina.

---

4. Perón, Juan Domingo: op. cit.
5. Speech delivered by the Mayor of the Municipality of San Lorenzo for the 160th anniversary of the death of General San Martín

---
SMALL WARS LEAD TO BIG WARS

The author, from a detailed explanation, relates the popular movements of the “Arab Spring” and provides us with an update about the problems that affect this part of the world in which Syria is the center of attention. The international community is carefully paying attention to the evolution of this conflict in which, as in any dynamic, complex and unfinished situation, there are more questions than answers.

By Omar Locatelli

ARDENT REVOLUTIONARY SCALE

A Tunisian merchant’s scale gave rise to popular expressions that made rulers confront with the ruled ones leading to changes that are difficult to predict and to recognition of the citizen’s power.

At the beginning of the year 2011, in the Middle East and Northern Africa, from Tunisia to Egypt, including Libya, Jordan, Yemen, Bahrain, there were popular movements that were called the “Arab Awakening”, which still exist in Syria and are now known as “Arab Spring”. Beyond the different ways in which the Spring ended in each country, only in Syria we can still see that the conflict may extend and change from a civil war to a regional conflict.

On March 15, 2013, it was two years since Syrian students painted graffiti in the southern city of Daraa, an event that led to one of the bloodiest conflicts of the 21st century. This
conflict has reached the chilling toll of 110,000 victims, both civilians and military men, and four million displaced persons in refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt and Syria. Also, almost 1.5 billion dollars were invested in international aid, a billion for bordering countries with refugee camps and the rest for Syria.

REGIONAL ORIGIN

The student demonstrations against the administration of Daraa were followed by formal demonstrations in the city of Homs and, then, the one- hundred- year- old Aleppo, economic capital of the country.

The president, Bashar al- Assad, thought he could control these protests against him in the same way his father, Hafez al- Assad, had done in 1982 when he calmed a domestic revolution in Homs, destroying different neighborhoods and causing the death of almost 20,000 Syrians.

The controversy became almost a civil war when part of the armed forces defected in clear opposition to the decision to operate against civil population in military terms.

The Free Syrian Army was formed and it initially had 30,000 troops (deserters) at the order of Colonel Riad al- Assad and Malik al- Kurdi, as second chief. Also, it had insurgent popular forces, such as al- Baraa battalion which fights in Damascus and the Ansar al- Jabhat al- Nusra li- Ahl al- Sham Front (translated as the Support Front for the Syrian People) in Aleppo, commanded by Abu Ibrahim. The latter is composed by Syrians, Moroccans, Libyans, Tunisians and Lebanese related to Al- Qaeda and considered as terrorists by the United States.

The evolution of actions made it possible for the Iraqi Al- Qaeda extension to be present under the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and al- Sham (old name of Great Syria) fighting with the experience acquired in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As random information, the conflict was increased by the religious controversy as there was a confrontation between Alawi governmental troops (12% of the population), related to Shias against a Sunni majority (60%) with the international support of the same denomination which tries to prevent a Shia preponderance caused after the Arab Spring. This confession breakup, which took place in the 7th century, has divided Islam between Sunni and Shia.

OVERLAPPING PROBLEMS

The original polemos is complemented by the fact that Syria is the third world arsenal of chemical weapons, particularly of Sarin gas and VX with production and storage facilities in the vicinity of the cities of Aleppo, Homs, Houla, Damascus and near Latakia port.

In addition to this, there is the Kurdish problem which, although it is the greatest ethnic minority in the Middle East, it is not settled as nation- state in any way. Its original territory is divided into Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria and

At the beginning of the year 2011, in the Middle East and Northern Africa, from Tunisia to Egypt, including Libya, Jordan, Yemen, Bahrain, there were popular movements that were called the “Arab Awakening”, which still exist in Syria and are now known as “Arab Spring”.

12
there are between 55 and 60 million people of Sunni Islam religion (there are no accurate censuses).

The Syrian government supports the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which is opposed to the Turkish government, so its Kurdish followers in Syria are facing the dilemma of fighting for the Syrian rebels of Sunni religion or support the Syrian government.

For the time being, there is the main trend to support the rebels with the idea that, after their success, pursue their independence as nation occupying, by means of a revolution, the land where they live in the four nations.

Among the main combatants in the north of Syria, there are: the Kurdish Islamic Front, the Peshmerga Army, the Mecca Martyr and the so-called Grandsons of Saladin.

Apart from the problems mentioned, there is the insurrection of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and the Israeli frontiers who, according to their Islam religion, favor the support to one of the contenders. The result of this was a marked anti Sunni crusade in Lebanon due to the alliance between alawites with Hezbollah1 (of Shia confession), giving rise to armed conflicts in its border with Syria.

Last, the conflict made Sunni Islam Jihadists to meet in Syria to fight against alawites with the purpose of creating a network like Al-Qaeda with international perspective.

HEGEMONIC POWERS AND SYRIA

The main ally of the Syrian government is Iran which, together with Hezbollah, the Lebanon Islam armed organization, form a Shia regional alliance, called "Axis of Evil" by certain western countries.

Iran, apart from being a political-regional ally, has a mere military influence as it facilitates training, doctrine and logistic support for an eventual impact, by means of Hezbollah, on Israel.

Russia, after Iran, has a long economic relationship regarding the sale of weapons. It is an important client but a strategic partner: it supplies MIG aircrafts, attack helicopters and high technology air defense system. In 1980, it signed a Consulting Agreement in case of threat to peace and for military cooperation that links it to Syria in military terms.

Also, there is a logistic support base in the Syrian port of Tartus that makes it possible for it to exit through the Mediterranean. This city has already been the seat of the 5th Squadron of the Mediterranean Soviet Fleet.

Turkey, its nearest neighbor, is the one that deals with controversy as rebels use it as an open border both for the entrance of support and the exit of refugees. It was its main partner because of the Free Trade Agreement signed in 2002, which is in force since 2007 up to the beginning of the confrontation.

Since 2005, the United States have blamed Syria for the death of the Lebanese premier, Rafik Hariri, a fact that affected the regional balance in Lebanon and placed it further from the West and reinforced the prior Syria-Lebanon relationship which was required by the UN Resolution 1559 (September, 2004) for the purposes of withdrawing Syrian troops from Lebanon.

President Obama changed foreign policy in order to make an approach. However, the event at the US embassy in Libya made the conflict be left aside. Today, the United States is searching for a political solution without its own military intervention while the use of chemical weapons is avoided in any sense.

Israel keeps a de facto status quo after its confrontation for the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War occupying territories conquered without any Syrian reaction until that moment.

MILESTONES

After the protests against the torture on students who made graffiti about the government in Daraa, the government sent tanks to rebel cities against the demonstrators without making the required reforms.

In December, 2011, the Free Syrian Army was organized with military and police deserters as well as civilians with operating base in Turkey. Also, the Syrian National Council and the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change in Syria started to operate in Istanbul.

International pressure from the United States and the European Union was increased until the entrance of Syria in the Arab League was cancelled, thus making it possible to force the government’s removal from office.

On July 17, 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) considered the conflict a civil war and stated that, therefore, Humanitarian International Law (HIL) was to be applied.

There was an attack in Damascus the following day with a car bomb at the National Security building during which the Minister of Defense, Daoud Rajha and his second-in-command, Assef Shawkat, who was the brother in law and confidant of the president, died. Moreover, the president’s brother, Maher al- Assad, was severely injured. This was the turning point of the conflict. As from this moment, there was no turning back for any of the sides.

---

1. Translation of “Party of God” (from Hizb, party and Allah, God): Islam Organization from Lebanon that has a political and a paramilitary branch. It was founded in Lebanon in 1982 to respond to the Israeli intervention at that moment and they were trained, organized and founded by a contingent of the Revolutionary Guard of Iran. They receive weapons, training and financial support from Iran and have functioned as a “Syria blessing” since the end of the Evil War in Lebanon. Its leader is the sheik Hasan Nasralah.
On November 11 of that year, in Doha (Qatar), the Syrian National Council, following the proposal made by the United States of achieving a greater and better representation, chose new members and sheik Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib, an old imam who was respected as moderate national, was elected as president.

Also, it changed its name to National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces with representation of 14 provinces and a Military Revolutionary Council and an Executive Committee were created. There are 66 representatives in this new Council: nine are from the opposition, five are alawites and there is a seat for the Muslim Brotherhood.

As complement for the new Council, 260 rebel commanders chose 30 representatives to be part of the Military Supreme Council which named, by consensus, Brigadier- General Salim Idriss (old professor of the School of War) as Chief of Staff.

In light of the desire for a sectorial political direction according to the efforts made and the undesired consequence of an anarchical direction, original commanders were sought to be replaced with people who obeyed.

At the end of December, the UN representative, Ladhjar Brahimi, stated that a transition government with executive authority would be necessary to govern for months until the next elections. Also, it called a meeting in Geneva with representatives from the United States and Russia to collaborate with the creation of this government supported by a Peacekeeping Force to monitor the ceasefire.

On November 11 of that year, in Doha (Qatar), the Syrian National Council, following the proposal made by the United States of achieving a greater and better representation, chose new members and sheik Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib, an old imam who was respected as moderate national, was elected as president.

Also, it changed its name to National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces with representation of 14 provinces and a Military Revolutionary Council and an Executive Committee were created. There are 66 representatives in this new Council: nine are from the opposition, five are alawites and there is a seat for the Muslim Brotherhood.

As complement for the new Council, 260 rebel commanders chose 30 representatives to be part of the Military Supreme Council which named, by consensus, Brigadier- General Salim Idriss (old professor of the School of War) as Chief of Staff.

In light of the desire for a sectorial political direction according to the efforts made and the undesired consequence of an anarchical direction, original commanders were sought to be replaced with people who obeyed.

At the end of December, the UN representative, Ladhjar Brahimi, stated that a transition government with executive authority would be necessary to govern for months until the next elections. Also, it called a meeting in Geneva with representatives from the United States and Russia to collaborate with the creation of this government supported by a Peacekeeping Force to monitor the ceasefire.

By the end of January, 2013, Syria reported that Israeli aircrafts attacked a Research Center in the suburbs of Damascus and there were two victims but the target sought was not stated.

Sources from the United States said that these Israeli aircrafts attacked with a Syrian column that was going to Lebanon and transported SA- 17 missiles addressed Hezbollah. The Lebanese army confirmed that 12 Israeli aircrafts made two intrusions on the Lebanese air space and did not mention any attack. Israel only stated that it kept the right to carry out preventive actions to avoid a regional weaponry imbalance in favor of Hezbollah.

In February, the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, announced during his meeting in Rome with the leader of the Syrian opposition, Mouaz al-Khatib, that his country would support them with food and medicine. Also, it would send 60 million dollars as health and education aid to areas under rebel control.

The Sheik, who was angry, did not thank for the support emphasizing that rebels are fed up with western complaints about extremists in their ranks, in clear reference to the Al-Nusra front that operates in Aleppo. He added that the true enemy is the Assad regime but that the West is more concerned only about the length of combatants’ beards.

Other European nations, such as the United Kingdom and France, are considering a stop of the embargo on Syria to send lethal weapons (armored vehicles, night goggles and armored vests) to support the rebels.

Saudi Arabia, like the rebels, claims for a greater intervention of the United States that is analyzing to train rebels on the field.

Two political internal situations that are worth mentioning can be added to the complex military evolution. The sheik Ahmad Badr al-Deen Hassoun, known to be...
On July 17, 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) considered the conflict a civil war and stated that, therefore, Humanitarian International Law (HIL) was to be applied.

Sunni but close to the Syrian government urged all parents on TV and the graphic media from his country to recruit their children to the Syrian army to defeat a conspiracy of foreign enemies, including the Arab traitor, Zionism and the West. This can also be interpreted as the lack of enough troops to support the government.

On March 19, the Syrian government and the rebels exchanged some accusations about a lethal attack launched at great height allegedly with chemical weapons in the area of Khan al-Assal, in the north of Aleppo province killing 26 people. The UN started some research on this in response to a formal request made by the Syrian government that blames the rebels on having caused the incident during the visit of president Obama to the Middle East.

The opposition leader, sheik Moaz al-Katib, resigned on March 24 from his office after Ghassan Hitto, a Syrian-American candidate supported by Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected to be prime minister of a transition government that starts to govern over territories freed by the rebels.

Al-Katib declared to be against the idea of forming a coalition government because this proposal, which also included the reincorporation to the Arab League and a greater financial support, would make Syria be divided in two: the northern part for the rebels and the southern part under the current regime.

The Arab League accepted the representatives from the opposition to take the place of Syria during a summit held in Doha (capital of Qatar), who took the seat for the first time since the administration of president Bashar al-Assad was suspended in November, 2011. The decision was made after the emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifah al-Thani, urged other Arab leaders to make a formal invitation. The opposition also demanded the Syrian seat at the UN but Algeria, Iran and Lebanon opposed to this.

In April, Syrian troops, supported by Hezbollah and the Iranian Republican Guard, started a successful second offensive to counterattack rebels in the positions reached near the Jordanian border, in the province of Daraa and in the city of Al-Qusair, near the highway that joins Damascus with the coast of Lebanon, which made it easier to carry weaponry from the Lebanese territory.

In May, the Israeli Air Force made a quick attack on Syria, the target of which was a load of high technology and long distance missiles aimed at Hezbollah. Aircrafts did not enter into Syrian territory, but shot from the Israeli border.

It also attacked the Center for Scientific Research in Jamraya, located in the suburbs of Damascus, causing some casualties among those who manage chemical weapons facilities according to what was informed by the Syrian public television. Russia indicated that because of this attack at least 300 members of Unit 501 of Barzeh district died and there were hundreds of people in four hospitals.

In an interview with Telam agency, President Assad stated that he does not believe that several western countries really desire a solution in Syria and that he doubts about the success of the peace conference in Geneva.

On June 14, the Eager Lion exercise was carried out in Jordan and was made up of 8,000 troops, 5,000 of which belonged to the United States and the rest of them were from other 19 nations with the participation of F-16 and F-18 aircrafts.

American officers announced in July that Israel made an air attack in Syria near the Port of Latakia to destroy a warehouse of anti-ship missiles of Yakhont type from Russia. However, officials did not give information about the level of damage or the number of missiles destroyed.

Last, Assad authorized on August 19 the entrance of a group of experts from the UN who, at the request of the Secretary General, are carrying out some research about an alleged use of chemical weapons in Khan al-Assad, near Aleppo, during which 26 people died and both parties accuse each other of having used them.

In May, the Israeli Air Force made a quick attack on Syria, the target of which was a load of high technology and long distance missiles aimed at Hezbollah. Aircrafts did not enter into Syrian territory, but shot from the Israeli border.

It also attacked the Center for Scientific Research in Jamraya, located in the suburbs of Damascus, causing some casualties among those who manage chemical weapons facilities according to what was informed by the Syrian public television. Russia indicated that because of this attack at least 300 members of Unit 501 of Barzeh district died and there were hundreds of people in four hospitals.

On June 14, the Eager Lion exercise was carried out in Jordan and was made up of 8,000 troops, 5,000 of which belonged to the United States and the rest of them were from other 19 nations with the participation of F-16 and F-18 aircrafts.

American officers announced in July that Israel made an air attack in Syria near the Port of Latakia to destroy a warehouse of anti-ship missiles of Yakhont type from Russia. However, officials did not give information about the level of damage or the number of missiles destroyed.

Last, Assad authorized on August 19 the entrance of a group of experts from the UN who, at the request of the Secretary General, are carrying out some research about an alleged use of chemical weapons in Khan al-Assad, near Aleppo, during which 26 people died and both parties accuse each other of having used them.
On September 9, in Moscow, the Minister of Foreign Relations of Russia, Sergei Lavrov, called on Syria to sign and ratify the Convention on Chemical Weapons that bans the production, storage and use of these weapons stating that if there is international control on chemical weapons in Syria, we will be able to prevent attacks and we will immediately start to work with Damascus.

After Russia proposed to avoid an American attack making Syria hand over its chemical weapons, the Minister of Foreign Relations from France, Laurent Fabius, proposed the Security Council to issue a resolution stating Chapter 7 of the UN Charter that allows its members to use military action to enforce their proposals.

On September 13, the Secretary of State of the United States, John Kerry, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov and the envoy of the United States, Lakhdar Brahimi, together with groups of weapon control officials. The result of the meeting was more complications than possible solutions.

The United States defended the need to carry out a surgical attack in Syria after August 21 to reinforce the message to Iran not to permit the presentation of a nuclear device keeping the armed option as the last resort.

The American decision to adjourn military action in Syria increased Israel’s concern about the fact that the credibility of US policy towards Iran would be eroded.

Lavrov highlighted the effort of the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, to persuade President Bashar al-Assad to sign the treaty that prohibits the use of chemical weapons and his initiative to organize the Peace Conference (postponed since May 2013) with representatives from both parties.

In this opportunity, Russia wanted to include Iran while the United States opposed to this and suggested including the group “Friends of Syria”, 11 European and Arab nations that have been supporting the Syrian resistance, something that was rejected by Moscow.

Another complication that appeared in Syria is the unlikelihood that the Syrian opposition negotiates because rebel leaders oppose Obama’s decision to postpone military action and explore a disarmament plan with the Russians.

However, Secretary Kerry talked to General Idris and Ahmad al-Jarba, military and political leaders of the Syrian opposition and assured that the armed option is still on the table. Moreover, the United States would insist on the fact that any understanding on chemical weapons must be based on the verification and execution of pertinent controls. This statement obfuscated the Russians.

On September 13, Assad publicly announced that his country would enter the Convention on Chemical Weapons. One of the requirements to be part of it is that Syria must submit a statement indicating types, amounts and location of its chemical weapons and the location of all its production facilities 60 days before formally becoming part of the agreement.
On the following day, the United States and Russia reached an agreement by which Syria was requested to remove or destroy all its chemical weapons before mid-2014. According to this agreement signed by the American Secretary of State, John Kerry, and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, international inspectors should be in Syria in November 2013.

Both countries agreed that there are about 1,000 tons of chemical weapons which include SARIN gas and sulfur mustard, stored in 45 places. Half of them have “exploitable amounts”. There is no evidence these have been moved to Iraq or Lebanon as it was accused by the Syrian opposition.

Syria started to comply with its part of the agreement by sending a list of its chemical weapons to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that, at the beginning of October, sent its inspectors to Syrian territory.

At the end of September, after the UN General Assembly, the Security Council issued a resolution on an ambitious plan that prohibits the use, development, production and/or storage or retention of chemical weapons to Syria. This resolution also includes the prohibition to transfer these weapons to other countries under penalty of applying the sanctions established in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

The last, and most inspiring, point is the future Geneva II Conference (November, 2013). The United States and Russia imposed, among their conditions, that representatives of Assad and the opposition be present to discuss the future of the country. This adds to the request made by the Moscow for the meeting to be held under the UN umbrella in presence of Iran.

The fall of Assad would favor Sunni power in the Syrian government which means a decrease in the political and military influence of Hezbollah. This scenario would facilitate a new power balance among different religions. This would have an impact on Saudi Arabia and the Sunni from the Gulf who would keep the power of their moderate confession supremacy within the Arab League. It would also favor the decrease in the influence of Iran and its attempt to become a predominant power. It would reduce the weaponry support to Hezbollah and Hamas.

If Bashar al-Assad gets out of the Syrian government, it would be easier to have a pro-western approach of the country being further from Iran and Hezbollah.

The Syrian reunification would be under Sunni control and would have an unknown end improving the relation of religious minorities, among which there are the Kurdish.

In Syria, no solution is clean

For Syria, the Arab Spring has an inconclusive end with as
For Syria, the Arab Spring has an inconclusive end with as many questions as main and secondary actors and little time for definition.

many questions as main and secondary actors and little time for definition.

Evolution is still uncertain because neither the Arab League nor the United States, Russia or China will allow for a governmental success that includes killing in a civil war. There is no certainty as to the coming out of the president which allows the access of military rebel organizations that cannot be governed by a weak and heterogeneous political direction.

There is no clear solution that does not spoil principles stated by different actors.

After the eventual surgical operation led by the United States has stopped, the balance of opportunities favors the rebels again because the open use of chemical weapons has not been prohibited to the Syrian government.

Rebels, even without the support of lethal weapons as promised by the West, still have the support of the Arab League and openly begin to receive the support from the CIA.

Russia, as improvised pacifist, cannot do anything but play the role of diplomatic mediator that does not allow it to supply the Syrian government with weapons.

The UN becomes relevant as it is the element that, apart from trying to find peaceful solutions, will be responsible for controlling and, eventually, destroying any chemical weapons found.

With his worldwide vigil, Pope Francis could get the echo to stop military actions of the main powers. This was different from what happened with Benedict XVI.

The government of the United States, affected by having declaimed red lines that it could never enforce and in spite of having prevented war, still has its distance missile capability alert which it will use without prior notice in light of the potential breach of control clauses.

The Syrian situation, beyond the temporary status quo, does not show an easy nor close exit unless there is a military solution. On the contrary, as from the original conflict between the government and the Syrian people, confrontations increased: Sunni against Shia, moderate rebels against extreme Jihadist; Hezbollah against Al-Qaeda; Kurdish against extreme rebels and even a memorable cold war between Russia and the United States.

Also, as Syria accepted an inspection on chemical weapons, there are some other challenges of similar importance but which require immediate attention:

> How to protect inspectors during a war under development?
> How to find a place for the destruction of chemical weapons near the Syrian coast while this is under the control of Assad’s government?

In order to assess the role of every participant, both external and internal in a post-conflict scenario, it is necessary to be able to answer the following complex questions:

> How long will it be possible to keep the international armed mission for the control of chemical weapons without stopping hostilities?
> Will this control prevent them from being used again?
> Will Iran let its main regional ally succumb before the popular demands at a stage close to a confronted negotiation with the West?
> Will the conflict evolve to include Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar on one side and Hezbollah and Iran on the other side?
> What will the role of Turkey, the only pro-Western Islamic hegemonic power be?
> What will the situation of Israel and Lebanon be during the post-conflict situation with relation to Syria and between them?
> Will the Kurdish continue their struggle for independence and the formation of their desired Kurdistan?
> Will Syria be divided into three parts?

Is the friendly goodbye after the conversation between president Rohani from Iran and president Obama from the United States credible for the future of the Middle East?

During an interview of Bashar al-Assad with CBS, after the gas attack, the President warned that small wars lead to big wars. In return, nothing better than the words of president Putin in “A call on precaution from Russia” published in The New York Times, in which, he expresses that: We are all different but when we ask for God’s blessings, we must not forget that God has created all of us as equal.

Insha’Allah (may God want) that in a region that may directly call the heavens of the main monotheistic confessions, communication is not interfered with so that the prayers of so many souls in pain can be clearly heard before the noises of war affect communication.

> REFEREED ARTICLE

2. Author’s note: This conversation between the presidents of the United States and Iran took place at the end of the UN Assembly. President Rohani was going to the airport when he called Mr. Obama to discuss how to make the West reduce their pressure of embargoes over Iran as from the moment they allow for inspections of their nuclear development. This conversation was 15 minutes long and ended with the wish, from both sides, to have a nice day and the answer in Farsi.
CULMINATING POINT AND DESIRED END STATE

In this essay, the author relates two key elements of the operational design. The culminating point of the attack and the defense at the different direction levels as an important concept for decision making in order to reach the desired end effect.

By Jorge Paulo Barrales

INTRODUCTION
The concept of culminating point was developed by Clausewitz in the context of terrestrial armed conflicts of his times. According to his dialectical approach to war, the attack and defense are permanently interacting causing the multiple factors that drive forces, both moral and material, of the attack and defense, to increase on the one side in the same proportion they decrease on the other side.

This complex and multiple interaction results in a relative power relation that favors one of the parties, but it is always prone to be modified with the conflict dynamics and it is crucial to acknowledge when it is an irreversible trend.

We can take Clausewitz's thought about the war as a tool for politics: what the assailant gained with their attack by means of a power relation that is favorable but decreasing before the reduction of this supremacy prevents them from doing so^2.

For this reason, the assailant should not go beyond a point, from which the favorable power capital begins to reduce until everything gained is lost. At this point, called by the author “Culminating Point of the Victory”, the assailant should stop and defend themselves.

1. At the operation and tactical level, this power relation is called Relative Combat Power.
2. Clausewitz, Carl von, De la Guerra; Editorial Labor, Barcelona, 1976, Libro VII, Cap. 1 "El Ataque": “We must respond to this, of course, in the following way: supremacy of military forces is not an end, but a means. The end consists in either defeating the enemy, taking at least part of their lands, in order to place oneself in a position to make advantages gained to be relevant for the conclusion of peace.”
The importance of the culminating point lies in the fact that when the military leader acknowledges he has reached it, he is obliged to make a decision, whether to change the attitude to prevent them from failure or to persist in the attitude they had being aware of the implicit risk.

Clausewitz dealt with this issue in Book VII of his work on Attack relating it to a limit that the attacker should not pass. For this reason, successive thinkers referred to this as “Culminating Point of the Attack”. Throughout the years, other thinkers, pursuing an analogy with defense, gave origin to the idea of “Culminating Point of the Defense.”

The desired end state (or final desired situation) is a concept subsequent to the culminating point which was recently included in our joint military doctrine. It represents the situation aimed to be reached at the end of a conflict by means of the use of military, political and economic power (general and military strategic levels) or the military force in a major manner (operational level) or in an exclusive manner (tactical level).

The culminating point and desired end state are two elements of the operational design.

DESIRED END STATE

The desired end state is determined for all levels of conflict. At the Strategic and Military Strategic levels, the desired end state includes political (including diplomatic and sociocultural), economic and military aspects. At the operational level, aspects are mainly or exclusively military, unless there is an only theater of operations in which case the considerations for the Military Strategic level are valid. As regards the Tactical level, considerations are exclusively military.

Moreover, at the Strategic and Military Strategic levels, there is a maximum and a minimum end state. The maximum end state of the attack correspond to their highest acquisition aspiration and, for the case of the defense, it expresses their highest preservation expectation.

On the other hand, the minimum end state means for the attack that they have not obtained all they wanted but they did obtain more than they had before the conflict started maintaining the proper negotiation power by means of what they have obtained at an acceptable cost. For the defense, it implies preserving what is reasonably acceptable at the end of the conflict according to the relation of forces of the opposing forces.

At the Operational level, it is justified to establish a maximum and minimum end state when there is an only theater of operations. At the tactical level, given its concrete, simple and merely military nature, it is not reasonable to determine maximum and minimum criteria.

CULMINATING POINT

This concept is applicable to the three levels of conflict and, within them, to the attack and the defense.

We can define it as: The situation given during the development of a conflict, in which the power relation among the actors within the space in which they interact prevents one of them (or a group of them who form an alliance) from maintaining the strategic attitude, operational attitude or tactic operation in force with a reasonable success expectation forcing them to assess whether it is convenient to adopt a change of direction that prevents them from a highly probable failure.

However, in spite of the fact that crossing (in a conscious or unconscious way) the culminating point nearly always leads to failure, a brilliant feeling, the physical or psychological impossibility to change or, simply, failure to perceive that this point has been reached, may lead a leader to “go past it” and be successful anyway.

CULMINATING POINT: LEVELS OF CONDUCTION

At the strategic and military strategic levels, the concept of power involves the political, economic and military components and the power relation is the result of the interaction among opponents within the theater of operations and/or conflict that has them.

Among others, these are some of the causes that may lead one of the parties to their culminating point:

• Erosion of the national fighting will
• Decrease in popular support that is particularly vulnerable to the extension of the conflict and excessive toll
• International punishment and isolation
• Questioning the legitimacy of actions
• Industrial incapability to sustain the replacement of losses as they occur (responsibility of national strategic and military level)
• Breaking key alliances and other aspects

These causes may be part of the weakening of the Napoleonic conjunction between government, people and army (“people in arms”).

At the operational and tactical levels, the concept of
power refers to the combat power and the relative combat power relation resulting from the interaction of opponents within the theater of operations (operational level) and within the battlefield (tactical level) that includes them.

One of the causes that lead to reach the culminating point at operational level is the purpose of achieving multiple objectives during the campaign without taking care of space, mass and time dimensions, having the last one of these five meanings: time opportunity, pace, duration, sequence and simultaneity.

**CULMINATING POINT OF THE OFFENSIVE**

In theory, we can consider that this culminating point of the offensive is the space-time situation in which the superiority of the attacker is not enough to reach, with a reasonable success perspective, the minimum desired end state (political, economic and military) at the General Strategic and Military levels and the military desired end state at the Operational and Tactical levels.

This means that the attacker in these conditions should, of course, fail but the unexpected from war may lead him to victory.

**At the strategic and military strategic levels**

This is the space-time situation in which the actor or actors that had an offensive strategic attitude within the theater of war and/or conflict must, at the minimum, adopt a strategic pause or, at the maximum, turn to a defensive strategic attitude in all theaters of operations or, at least, in the main one with the purpose of maintaining their capacity to comply with the finalization criteria that correspond to the military strategic desired end state expressed in minimum terms.

**At the operational level**

This is the space-time situation in which the actor or actors that had an offensive strategic attitude within the theater
of operations must, at the minimum, take an operational pause or, at the maximum, turn to a defensive operational attitude with the purpose of maintaining their capacity to comply with the finalization criteria that correspond to the operational desired end state (or the minimum operation state if there is an only one theater of operations).

This defensive operational attitude will materialize by means of a detention defensive operational maneuver.

For the change of operational attitude to be considered as made, it is enough for it to have been made in the main operational effort and, in this case, the secondary operational efforts may continue in the offensive at tactical level although the operational attitude will have changed.

Among the causes that lead to this change of attitude, especially in the offensive, those of logistic nature will prevail over those of tactical nature (example: strangulation of logistic chain).

At tactical level
This is the space time situation in which the actor or actors that conducted an offensive operation in a battlefield of a theater of operations must, at the minimum, adopt a “combat pause”, which can be mobile, of zone or mixed in order to maintain the capacity to contribute to the compliance with the operational desired end state.

Among the causes that lead to this change of attitude, especially in the offensive, those of logistic nature will normally prevail over those of logistic nature (example: loss of the OODA loop, observe, orient, decide and act, exhaustion of “tempo”, etc.)

CULMINATING POINT OF THE DEFENSIVE
Taking into consideration that the culminating point of the defensive is the space time situation in which the remaining power of the defender applied to make a timely change of attitude will allow him to keep, at the expense of space, a mass capital and/or time with a certain possibility to effectively reinvent it in the context of the immediately superior conduction level.

At strategic and military strategic levels
This is the space time situation in which the actor or actors that had a defensive strategic attitude must redistribute the power remaining in the theater of war, reinforcing the main theater of operations at the expense of the secondary theaters before losing the opportunity to reach the military strategic desired end state with the minimum finalization criterion.

The causes that lead to this change of attitude are similar to those of the culminating point of the offensive.

In the case of an only theater of operations, the defender will bet everything to a defensive operational attitude that allows him to reach the minimum finalization criterion of the military strategic and operational desired end state which, in this case, would coincide.

Under this circumstance, it would be key for the defender to capitalize the passage of time aiming at reinforcing his internal front (national pride, survival spirit, etc) while those of the attacker are weakened (adverse public opinion and international condemnation to his condition of assailant, among others.)

At operational level
This is the space time situation in which the actor or actors, who had a defensive operational attitude within the theater of operations materialized by a detention defensive operational maneuver, do not have the military ability to keep it but they do have enough ability to adopt a retardant and/or withdrawal defensive operational attitude that actually contributes to the minimum desired end state of the pertinent Military Strategic level.

At tactical level
This is the space time situation in which the actor or actors who conducted a defensive operation on a battlefield of a
theater of operations must change their defense which may be mobile, of zone or mixed\textsuperscript{17} due to a delay, retreat and/or withdrawal before the cohesion loss prevents them from making this change.

Causes that lead to this change of attitude may be:
\begin{itemize}
  \item Incapacity to conduct operations inherent to the defense dynamic, especially counterattack.
  \item Loss of mutual support among strong points of the defensive system.
  \item Early loss of tactical mobility, etc.
\end{itemize}

With the same criteria taken into consideration for the culminating point of the offensive, the culminating point of the defensive must offer an alternative to the defender in this case through a timely change of attitude, delay, retreat and/or withdrawal and not by leading them to collapse due to their loss of counter-attack capacity as stated by some lines of thought\textsuperscript{18}.

\textbf{Planned and assessed Culminating Point}

Based on the dialectic approach of Clausewitz, we can deduct that at every moment of the offensive- defensive interaction, four culminating points coexist, two of which correspond to the attacker and two to the defender\textsuperscript{19}:
\begin{itemize}
  \item On the side of the attacker:
    \begin{itemize}
      \item The culminating point of the offensive established in their operational design so that they reach the objective before reaching that point.
      \item The defender's culminating of the defensive assessed by the attacker.
    \end{itemize}
  \item On the side of the defender:
    \begin{itemize}
      \item The culminating point of the defensive established in their operational design so that they take as long as possible to reach that point.
      \item The attacker's culminating point of the offensive assessed by the defender that will act on them so that the attacker may early cross them.
    \end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

\textbf{One of the causes that lead to reach the culminating point at operational level is the purpose of achieving multiple objectives during the campaign without taking care of space, mass and time dimensions, having the last one of these five meanings: time opportunity, pace, duration, sequence and simultaneity.}

In both cases, culminating points established in the operational design will have the impact of the frictions of war that affect everything that has been planned while the culminating points assessed will be affected by the fog caused by the lack of certainty inherent to an assessment over the enemy.

In the mind of commanders who are opposed, the culminating point they find in the enemy influences over the one they have planned making them conduct themselves with greater or lesser care with respect to the last one according to the effects they consider they have produced in the culminating point they assessed for their opponent.

Additionally, at the operational level, even the very own culminating point is difficult to be identified and it is therefore perceived retrospectively\textsuperscript{20}.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

Professional training and experience, involvement with the intention of the superior command and, lastly, their capacity to decide with instinct are the tools of the commander (at all levels) to adopt a decision when they are about to reach their culminating point which will, for sure, impact on their own desired end state and on the superior command that includes them.
THE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE

An approach to the functions of a model for its management

The suggestive title of a book “If Only we Knew What we Know” leads us to the management of an organization knowledge which must assure, develop and implement an updated model of military art.

By Miguel Podestá
INTRODUCTION TO A CURRENT ISSUE

It is nowadays usual to highlight that we are part of a knowledge society or that we are part of an era that privileges it, among other things, due to the easy access to information that we have today as from a sustained technological progress that still amazes us, those of us who are part of an older generation.

However, in the military agenda, other traditional issues, such as strategy, current and future scenarios, operational skills to be developed, logistics to be implemented or even aspects inherent to the formal bureaucracy take most of our discussions. In an attempt to avoid these habits, this essay is aimed at analyzing the treatment of knowledge management in the military environment, which is an issue about which there is a lot to be done.

The contemporary importance of knowledge in an organization, according to Hislop, is due to three main factors which are related to each other:

- The first one is that to the end of the 20th century, we have seen amazing social and economic changes that have turned knowledge into the key for the conduction of organizations.
- The second one refers to the fact that the nature of work has significantly changed from one that gave importance to physical effort to one that gives more relevance to intellectual activity.
- The third one is the correct administration of the knowledge basis by an organization which gives it an undeniable competitive advantage over its adversaries.

In light of such an important issue as knowledge is, it seems to be necessary to limit our proposal to what the title suggests aiming, mainly, at encouraging the consideration of how military men manage the necessary knowledge in order to comply with our mission in society.

SOME BASIC IDEAS

The concept of Knowledge Management, although it already existed with some other approaches, gains importance at the beginning of the 90’s with books that call our attention about the treatment of knowledge in organizations. Later, conferences started, institutes were created, all types of publications appeared and it is greatly mentioned in the worldwide web.

Although there are no uniform criteria for one definition, according to Dalkir, we can state that:

Knowledge management is the deliberate and systematic coordination of the persons in an organization, technological processes and the organizational structure with the purpose of adding value through reutilization and innovation.

Knowledge management is the deliberate and systematic coordination of the persons in an organization, technological processes and the organizational structure with the purpose of adding value through reutilization and innovation.

This can be achieved by promoting creativity, sharing and applying knowledge and taking advantage of the valuable lessons learned and of the best practices that are in the corporate memory with the purpose of promoting ongoing organizational learning.

Another important concept is the one developed by Nonaka and Takeuchi who, in their theory about the creation of organizational knowledge, develop the process of knowledge communication around conversion modes between tacit and explicit knowledge, defining them as:

- Tacit knowledge: This is a very personal knowledge which is difficult to be expressed with formal language and, therefore, difficult to be transmitted and shared with others.
- Explicit knowledge: This is the knowledge that can be expressed by formal language; that is, with words and numbers and that can be easily transmitted and shared. It is generally expressed in some physical support.

1. Grayson, J. y O’ dell, C.; If Only We Knew What We Know; New York; The Free Press; 1998. 2. This is the name given by Peter Drucker in his book Post- Capitalist Society; 1993. Other authors that have emphasized the importance of knowledge in our times: Alvin Toffler and Robert Reich.
5. There were 185,000,000 hits in Google at 10 am on August 12, 2013.
6. Dalkir, Kimiz. Foreword by Jay Liebowitz; Knowledge Management in Theory and Practice; Second Edition; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Massachusetts; 2011, p. 4.
DEFINING THE SUBJECT AND OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE

In the military environment, the subject of knowledge is the military professional and the object is the use of the military component of national defense.

The subject of knowledge is a military professional whose training pillars have been the education received as part of their course curriculum or acquired with their own efforts and the practical experience acquired in the different military postings he has been assigned.

In a more concrete way, knowledge basically lies in the individuals of the organization which must create the most convenient environments with which to develop the necessary organizational knowledge to comply with their mission.

It is interesting to note that military knowledge relates to sciences. It is related to Human and Social sciences because of its deep relation with human behavior which require an effective military leadership as well as the political and social consequences of war; it is related to Health science because the mission of the Armed Forces normally implies the use of physical violence and, last, it is related to Basic and Applied sciences because the military potential is closely related to materials that are in constant technological evolution, a circumstance that has a great impact on current military operations.

From a contextual approach, in the opinion of Huntington: Military aptitude requires broad general culture knowledge in order to be dominated.

Methods to organize and apply violence in any history stage are closely related to the whole society cultural structure.

In the same way as, within its limits, law is confused with history, politics, economics, sociology and psychology, the same happens with military aptitude. Even more, military knowledge also has borders with natural sciences such as chemistry, physics and biology.

In order to understand their job, officers must have an idea of their relation with other knowledge fields and the way in which they can contribute to their purposes. Also, they cannot really develop their analytical skills, understanding, imagination and judgment if they are only trained in vocational disciplines.

This broad idea expressed by Huntington gives relevance to the concept of pertinence, observing that in many of the topics that give context to military knowledge, the reference theoretical framework is conveniently developed in different environments of our society which we must pay attention to.

The concept of pertinence, “relationship of an item with someone who is entitled to it”, leads us to define the delayed field of military knowledge, focusing on the aspects of interest arising from the mission of the Armed Forces to which the military knowledge effort must be oriented.

This set of knowledge must be explained, among other means, by a group of doctrine that has a double function: to lead action and contribute for the line of continuous knowledge acquired by the organization not to be interrupted (or, even worse, to go backwards) helping transition between generations.

As we have mentioned before, there is some other knowledge that is not exclusively pertinent to military issues and which is available in the civil context where it has acquired a greater level of development and is updated; it will be necessary then to resort to those sources in order to use it in our work without intending to copy it and waste huge efforts on that.

ITS RELATION WITH LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

If, as we have seen, knowledge has a relevant impact on a modern organization, its correct management is the responsibility of indirect leadership.

A possible initial question of a military leader will be ‘what is the knowledge situation in my organization with respect to the state of the art and the current military science?’

Military organizational culture, as a context in which this management will take place, will also have an influence on this process and there will be advantages, such as the capacity to rapidly implement ideas, and disadvantages, such as the little orientation to innovation and change.

Military organization has traditionally lied on its doctrine elements to produce explicit knowledge and on military institutions to disseminate it but, as we can easily conclude, this issue becomes more complex nowadays.

Some of the elements that must be articulated in such a way that they contribute to a modern management of the military knowledge are study centers, military research areas, operational training centers, simulators, libraries, institutes, courses in the civil sector and abroad, fora and practice communities.
There is also some tacit knowledge which is highly specific and lies with certain members of the organization who have a special cost over a certain topic or discipline, an outstanding creativity, a capacity to understand situation al contexts, etc. which require a special treatment because it is difficult to transform it into explicit knowledge. This process is known as the management of talent available in the organization.

This concept is included in the knowledge management and aims at preventing singular persons, whose training has had a huge cost for the national state or who show a high intellectual potential, from leaving the military institution early causing a loss of “corporate memory” or, even when staying at the institution, from not taking advantage of their competence.

Some history examples to think about the management of talent may be the following:

In 1882, the Second Lieutenant, Pablo Riccheri (22), who had graduated two years before from the Military Academy showing great professional skills, was authorized to study in Europe. After some time, he would become the organizer of the army at the beginning of the 20th century.

In 1904, the sub- lieutenant José María Sobral (24), after having been a member of the Swedish expedition to the Antarctica for which he was appointed because of his professional skills, requested authorization to study in Sweden. Having this possibility been denied, he sadly requested to be withdrawn and was admitted to Uppsala University from where he graduated with a PhD in natural science and had an outstanding performance in the civil sector.

BASIC FUNCTIONS OF A POSSIBLE MODEL

The military organization has to develop its own definition of knowledge management and develop a model for its implementation.

In this essay, we aim at making a brief analysis of what we consider the six main functions of a possible model: collect, update, generate, experiment, keep and spread.

The function of collecting implies the identification of the military knowledge necessary in a certain historical context and which is not current anymore and should be revoked. A first approach for this analysis results from the question: what knowledge do I need to fulfill the main mission and subsidiary missions that have been imposed?
If we refer to nowadays issues, topics such as the use of unmanned aerial vehicle, cyberwar or simpler actions such as the use of military forces for support to the community need professional knowledge.

It also implies knowing in which persons of the organization lies the knowledge required and it is here where the activities of education and personnel areas of the forces gain great importance.

The purpose of this function is to collect the necessary knowledge and to know who the people who actually have it are. Moreover, it may happen that we think we have the knowledge but there are no persons who have it or, on the contrary, we may think we do not have the knowledge and some members have it thanks to their effort to train themselves.

This function of collecting is a basic activity of doctrine organizations that may be supported by study centers of each service and by personnel who have been assigned a post abroad.

Once the necessary knowledge has been established, it may be available and it must be updated or generated because it is missing. In the first case, it is necessary to call experts of the institution. At this point, it may seem to be necessary to state that highly specific topics may make it not recommendable for any person, even with an outstanding professional performance in any other area, to be part of an updating team.

Another point that becomes relevant is how specific the method used to prepare it is. Our rules, in general, lack this item which is basic when addressing any subsequent updating.

The most complex issue appears when it is necessary to generate new knowledge which may be available in the country or abroad and this requires training professionals as a state prior to the development of doctrine in such a way that the knowledge acquired may become organizational knowledge.

At this point, the military research areas are called to have an important role if research lines match the vacancies for necessary knowledge.

As regards this aspect, leadership has to direct the effort to generate knowledge towards main topics that have a concrete application for the organization considering that the resources to be applied will be scarce.

A great part of the military knowledge will be used in conflict situations so its virtual or real experimentation in times of peace becomes especially significant.

Exercises carried out on the terrain or at an office are, in fact, the natural laboratory to test and validate the doctrine available. It, thus, becomes necessary to pay attention to execution conventions and to the way in which experiences acquired are collected in order for them to later be turned into explicit knowledge, refining the existing concepts or replacing them with new ones.

In this sense, from a historical perspective, Military Schools, such as the Joint Staff, have generally been a space for reflection, development and test of the concepts of use and this is proven by the fact that two of the greatest military thinkers in history have been the Director in charge of the Berlin General War Academy (1818-1830), Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and the Director of the US Naval War College (1886-1889 and 1892-1893), Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914).

Keeping explicit knowledge is another function. Apart from paper, it is necessary to have digital repositories that assure the storage of knowledge generated, beyond the doctrine, such as publications of the service, final assignments and post-degree theses of military interest.

These repositories help to access knowledge, they allow to know about the interest in publications, they generate enriching comments and, in compliance with intellectual property, they generate new approaches to topics.

Spreading knowledge is another step that implies sharing it through different means, teaching it in formal military education and being willing to discuss about it and revise it permanently. The latter may be the most difficult activity to carry out.

possible functions of a knowledge management model

Source: Author
If we educate our men in critical thinking as regards the paradigm established so that, based on valid arguments, they can either accept or improve it, the management of military thinking should acquire particular dynamics which would not probably be the same as in Wikipedia, but it is necessary to take into account and promote the active participation of the members of the institution.

This statement is also supported by the fact that the necessary knowledge is not found at the top of the organization but it is spread among persons that are part of it and their effective participation will lead to a natural motivation that will promote a greater commitment with their professional activity.

The ability to move in knowledge contexts in a flexible and quick way in order to create a dynamic knowledge cycle ultimately determines the ability of the organization to generate knowledge.

**FINAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Knowledge management in an organization is a responsibility of indirect leadership (strategic and organizational) that must conceive and implement a model that guarantees an updated military state related to the mission of the Armed Forces in a certain historical context.

A first step may be to include this topic in the usual military discussion generating the conditions to find the most proper ways for the model to be developed.

Our organizational culture may lead us to a situation in which there may be profuse regulations but the concrete results of quality knowledge actually produced and spread may be scarce.

Traditionally, this management has been taken by doctrine elements of the forces but, nowadays, the importance of the problem, the dynamics of information available, the impact of technology and diversity of intervening elements, among other aspects, require the study and implementation of a better model in which functional relations will have an important role.

The Education Center of the Armed Forces is called to take an important role in the design proposed as there are four post-graduate military colleges in its premises which have a great part of the military knowledge of our country.

---

**Keeping explicit knowledge is another function. Apart from paper, it is necessary to have digital repositories that assure the storage of knowledge generated, beyond the doctrine, such as publications of the service, final assignments and post-degree theses of military interest.**

The Armed Forces with state-of-the-art knowledge that is evidence of their high professional capacity do not only contribute to make the desired dissuasion credible, but they make it desirable for friendly countries to increase the relation of their military factor accelerating regional integration processes.

Being part of an institution that, apart from having a future vision of itself, has updated knowledge that contributes to the social perception of its professional capacity leads its members to have some natural pride that promotes a sense of belonging. Without these conditions, the existing talent will be discouraged and try to find new development horizons taking away with it part of the organization knowledge.

---

**Miguel Podestá**

General (R). Staff Officer of the Argentine Army and the Spanish Army. He holds a master’s degree in higher education from Universidad de Palermo. Since 2008, he is a professor of Planning and Conduction at the Joint Forces Staff College.
INTRODUCTION
The methodological division of war or conflict\(^2\) used until the year 2012 in the Argentine Armed Forces had four basic levels: national strategic, military strategic, operational strategic and tactical.

This classification was not in line with the one that existed in other countries in the world\(^3\) or the one that existed in different areas of the very national public sector; which could have made it difficult to carry out combined and inter-agency operations.

What is more, there was not a uniform concept at tactical level as some forces made another division into “superior tactics” and “inferior tactics”, which made joint action more complex.

On the other hand, it is possible to consider, although it is not listed in a formal division, that there are two additional levels at the ends of the scale: political and technical. Even though it is not necessary to be taken into consideration when actions are planned or conducted by the different instances, they should be considered when making a methodological analysis of the war phenomenon.

With relation to this, this academic essay aims at answering the following question: What would the most proper division of war levels be according to the needs of the Argentine Armed Forces?

As the pre-existing situation is perceived as disorganized, the idea is to “put order to what is not in order” regarding this classification of levels. As order relates to the harmonic arrangement of things according to certain categories, there is nothing better than putting ideas in order as a common order category: the relation ends-means. Once adopted, it will be necessary to start from the beginning: political level.

POLITICS, THE ART OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE
Politics is at the top of the process that allows to take ideas into action for conflict resolution\(^4\). This is the area of pure ideas. It has maximum freedom of action as, in order to make initial decisions, that is, to determine national interests and materialize them into political objectives, they can even disregard other actors that are part of the setting.

This standard (freedom of action that allows to disregard some situation factors when making decisions) is the one that distinguishes the different levels of war.

Politics, or rather “Politics” in capital letters, also sets modes of action to obtain them. These modes are called “policies”, in lower case letters. This lack of imagination to propose names for things, which is repeated in the case of “Strategy” and “strategies”, poses permanent problems when analyzing the topic\(^5\).

Once the political objective and policies (modes of action) to achieve it have been selected, a powerful assistant of politics comes into play: strategic intelligence. We could ask why we do not call it “political intelligence” because of the level in which it is placed. However, as its...
primary responsibility is to determine eventual threats for the objectives set by politics, that is, to determine possible conflicts, it goes up straight from the inferior level.

If strategic intelligence does not have opponents, politics starts to move towards objectives established managing its means and following policies set. If so, everything will occur in a peaceful and harmonic environment. But, unfortunately, this rarely happens. Generally, there will be other actors with the same end.

This competition may lead to a conflict. Then, there is the moment for the second political decision: to accept or avoid conflict. If accepted, strategy will come into play.

STRATEGY, THE KINGDOM OF UNCERTAINTY

As previously stated, accepting the conflict leads to strategy which can even prevent direct confrontation. By accepting to restrict their aspirations, it may give rise to “convergence” that is one of the ways to solve the conflict. If the greatest aspirations are not left aside, strategies start to be planned in order to solve it in their favour in several ways: by confronting the conflict, leaving objectives or delaying it until there is a better opportunity.

How is politics different from strategy and tactics? At this level, freedom of action implies disregarding means. That is, strategy guides means available to the ends and, if necessary,
it may develop those means. When implementing strategy (as steps to be followed) in order to reach the objective, it is possible to design modes of action for which there are no means and to develop them by means of “genetic strategy”. But why is it like this?

Because it is the kingdom of uncertainty and a way to dominate it is to add some information to it. Therefore, developing means implies adding information to the system.

This level must be initially divided into a general or national strategy, which is close to politics and into a particular or sectorial strategy.

In the first one, everything has to do with national power. In the second one, it is possible to work over the power component that the previous level decided to use for the solution of the conflict. However, the true strategic level is the general level.

The sectorial strategy is not actually a level in itself but it comes from the implementation of the general strategy to divide the problems into parts and to solve it more easily. This is so in such a way that in some countries, it is not considered a strategic level but a mere component of the national strategy. This is why some of them have three levels of war (strategic, operational and tactical) while others have four (general strategic, military strategic, operational and tactical).

The idea is to study the problem that exists in the field of the Armed Forces, the specific strategy that is of interest is the military strategy. Some authors wrongly divide it into joint military strategy and specific military strategy. In order to prepare the military strategy, the three Armed Forces are taken into consideration. It has been shown that in modern war, there are no independent strategies in the different geographical areas, but “specific” strategies are interdependent.

Even for the case that Beaufre calls “Genetic Strategy”, this strategy refers only to the development of means and the development of said means must be harmonic for the three Armed Forces according to a Joint Equipment Plan. There is a level that develops the global vision of the military instrument of the Nation and this is the Military Strategy level.

The strategic level must be initially divided into a general or national strategy and a particular or sectorial strategy. In the first one, everything has to do with national power. In the second one, it is possible to work over the power component that the previous level decided to use for the solution of the conflict.

When the military strategy needs specific means to allot them to operational commanders, it must have prepared them beforehand by developing joint doctrine, carrying out joint training, equipping forces based on the nature of the conflict that is to be faced, taking into account possible use contingencies and assuring their logistic support during the conflict. Since then, the responsibility is to take and bring troops to the Theater of Operations and sustain it during operations.

This is an important difference between these strategic levels and the following levels: Although strategy comes in light of a conflict, the following level will not be reached until the dialectics of wills does not make violence escalate. But, if it escalates, other levels will be reached. These levels have to do with the implementation of that direction: the one implementing direction with maneuver and logistics to take troops to their best conditions, the operational level, and the level in which the way to produce confrontation is implemented, the tactical level.

OPERATIONAL STRATEGY OR OPERATIONAL ART
The operational level was called operational “strategic” level. If we understand strategy as the availability of ends and means, distinguishing it from tactics because strategy uses the results of tactics, whether victory or defeat, we can infer that all levels make strategy.

From this, we can also infer that there is a methodological classification of strategy but this does not mean that names of levels may be changed. What is more, other names are universally accepted.

Direction levels make strategy; planning and execution levels also make strategy. Strategy at the operational level

---

Jorge Eduardo Lenard Vives
Colonel (R). Staff Officer. He holds a Degree in Strategy and Organization. He holds a post-graduate specialization in Strategic Intelligence. In 2007, he graduated from the Course on Joint Planning and Staff at the Joint Forces Staff College. He received the “Pluma Académica” award from the Army Staff College.

8. Until 1995, the United Kingdom had four levels of war. As from that year, they have three.
9. Translator’s Note: The verb “to operationalize” is a barbarism in Spanish because it is not correct to use it as a verb. It is probably a wrong translation from the English language and it has not been approved by the Real Academia Española.
is called operational strategy. As this disposal of means and ends requires a special skill and a unique creativity of the Commander, the strategy of the operational level can also be called operational art.

Strategy of means present is universally called tactics, although for the United Kingdom, operational art may be considered to be carried out at tactical level.

In conclusion, this operational level was not “strategic” as it did not direct, but it planned and executed the strategic direction. Therefore, it is not correct to call it “operational strategic level”, but simply operational level.

The original meaning is so connatural that the barbarism “to operationalize” has become usual (this is a verb derived from the operational level”)9). But the verb that has the same meaning is “to implement”: to take theory to practice.

This change of name will end discussions and will allow to get, from a conceptual point of view, to the next level: the tactical level.

**Tactics, Where Victory or Defeat Take Place**

Tactics appears when “shooting starts”. The operational level prepared the board: it put chess pieces into the square and now, as a referee in fencing strips, it says: “to you”. And means start to move until they finally crash (or not because this may be the intention of one of the contenders).

Of course they do not do this blindly: previously, tactical plans that set, among others, the objectives and lines of action have been prepared. Although this is done before action, they keep their feature of “tactical” as they are addressed to action.

This level does not seem to need a subdivision: why do we talk about “superior tactics” and “inferior tactics”? When these concepts are developed, the concept of “superior tactics” includes the conduction of the specific components of the Theater of Operations, the direction of the Great Battle Units and the logistic support of greater level and that is direct and specific to operations. On the other hand, “inferior tactics” included the development of combats of minor groups.

This subdivision was taken into consideration because the category of initial order had been suddenly changed:

**The idea of dividing a task into as many parts as it may be possible with the purpose of solving it in a better way... (is) probably the result of the participation of Descartes in the military tactics as the army has always divided and sectioned space and time and has always taught to assign duties.**

**Jean Guitton**
from the ends-means category to the category of the magnitude of the fractions that were confronted. It is true that in military operations, greater factions are conducted differently from smaller factions. However, the magnitudes of the forces that are confronted are not a valid category for the methodological division of war, the different geographical environments in which they are trained or the different types of equipment of the troops or specializations to which they belong would not be valid either.

Freedom of action lies in the possibility to change the operation under development beyond plans and predictions when the situation changes. At this level, humans act with all their spiritual and intellectual potential which is used by the tactical driver in order to carry out actions that, for the fulfillment of the mission, are imposed by circumstances.

This division into levels based on the category of ends-means allows to quickly find related events. It is clear that battle is about confrontation and, therefore, it is a tactical fact.

**IS TECHNIQUE A LEVEL OF WAR?**

Although this is a level that is not generally taken into consideration for studies regarding this topic, it may, at least, be necessary to consider whether to include it or not. This is where words actually die: there are not even orders because -unless the operator is in front of a device that is voice-activated- there is no talking but action.

This is the moment when the shooter shoots his gun, the submariner shoots his torpedo, the aviator sets the control of his cannons or machine guns. This is the direct interaction between the person and the machine.

As opposed to the previous level, there is no human will to be directed; there is only cold metal. There are no chances to correct the mistake either; in most cases, it is no longer possible to change the path of the projectile that is already in the air as this has to do with laws that cannot be controlled by men. (This is also the opportunity for hand-to-hand combat, man-to-man fight, something that may lead to interesting conclusions).

It is true that considering a technological level exceeds the order category taken to prepare the levels of war. Ideas are no longer ordered based on ends and means, but there is an arbitrary technical order category.

There is something that is unavoidable: the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs deals with the influence of technology in nature, purpose and way to conduct to war. It has changed since the age of Romans until nowadays.

The difference in our times is that it does so at greater speed and it sometimes exceeds our understanding.

Freedom of action is minimum: the decision is binary and, actually, the combatant is subject to taking the correct action, either because he is in a coercive or persuasive discipline environment or because of a mere question of survival.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Having the conceptual development of this essay been made, we cannot deny the fact that it was convenient to change the name of the “operational strategic” level to “operational” and to name the activity of disposal of ends and means “operational art” or “operational strategy”. This allows us to make a proper integration of planning when combined and inter-agency operations must be carried out. Also, and more importantly, it will allow us to improve our understanding of the conflict phenomenon.

It is worth mentioning that, beyond the classification adopted by our Armed Forces, it is convenient to set four levels when analyzing the war phenomenon or the conflict: political, strategic, operational and tactical. Technique and its evolution will lead to changes in the way war is conducted and this will affect all levels. The difference among these levels is the freedom of action that exists at the moment of making a decision; that is, at the moment of going from ideas to action, that is the core aspect of this classification.

We must understand that this division into levels is not real, but an abstraction to clarify the conflict and to have a mental scheme that relates events. The only way the human being knows to understand a problem is to analyze it, to divide it into parts. The subsequent synthesis is creativity which joins the parts that seem not to be related.

An inflexible meaning of this division may give rise to the rigid attitude of trying to force plans and actions to fit into a scheme that is a methodological tool to understand this chaotic and complex and, therefore, entropic, phenomenon of war. Actually, the limits among those levels are vague, they sometimes overlap and many times, they disappear, especially in the so-called fourth generation wars.

The only intention of this classification into levels is to add, as stated in the title of this essay, some “negentropy”; that is, to reduce the amount of uncertainty that may exist in these concepts.
OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS AND THE LIMITS OF THE CAMPAIGN

Logistics condition the operational limits of the campaign. Operations and logistics are two sides of any war that cannot be separated. Although logistical plans are derived from operational objectives, there is no area of command that can claim primacy.

By Leonardo Arcadio Zarza

INtroDUCtion

In order not to make mistakes as regards national defense, the aim is to train Commanders of military operations that can integrate and interact in joint staff and can be competent as regards joint military planning. Also, the development of competence for any commander to properly manage human and material resources in case of crisis is implicit.

Logistics, at the maximum levels of command, is so important that it conditions the execution of military operations. If this aspect is not clear in the design of any military campaign, efforts will be useless and may lead to great inconvenience.

When training commanders, it is generally said that a proper knowledge of strategy allows to know how to do something and a proper management of logistics gives the possibility to do something.

The whole joint provisions of the area of logistics is to be updated with the purpose of generating situational awareness, critical and creative thinking in any military commander so that they can understand the problem of logistics and, therefore, make the right decision during critical moments as to how much would be really enough.

At operational level, besides the operational maneuver, there is also implicit a logistical maneuver. It finds its origin upon its conception (design) and ends when the user sees that his requirements have been met (planning and execution of logistical responsibilities).

Logistical maneuver is part of the operational maneuver and implies assuring that logistical support is permanent, proper and sufficient.

Even though it may seem a bit exaggerated for some positions that exacerbate the importance of the role of the operations cell in any staff, it may be possible to state that
logistics, at operational level of war set conditions to the maneuver, while at tactical level of war, logistics is subject to its maneuver.

**THE MILITARY LOGISTICAL SYSTEM**

Logistics is understood as the science and art that, when applied to the military environment, refer to the set of activities aimed at generating and sustaining military capabilities providing resources with the proper aptitude in quantity, quality, at the right time and place⁴. Logistical support in the military will include personnel, materials and finance.

Material logistics includes responsibilities regarding supply, transport, Infrastructure, maintenance and others (real property, firefighting, veterinary, zone damage control and security in the rear area).

Personnel logistics includes maintenance of troops, Replacement, staff management, discipline, law and order, prisoners of war, Military Welfare Service, obituary, internal administration, civil administration, health service and accidents prevention. Last, one of the most important areas of logistical command is finance, includes budget, credit and funds.

Military logistics has the feature of having a close coordination and integrity of procedures developed from the inferior levels up to the maximum specific or joint level in order to get and maintain the operational reach required by the Force.

In order to understand its importance as to command, it is necessary to address logistics from a systemic approach.

The logistical system is a set of organic structures, means, procedures and methods that will allow to develop logistical responsibilities, the mission of which will be to make human and material resources interact in an organized way so that objectives previously set can effectively be achieved.

Besides this, it includes the set of stages that are part of the logical sequence (logistic cycle) that will be executed by means of a procedure already accepted for the purpose of achieving logistical objectives (to give support to a certain action) through the proper and rational use of resources (at the lowest cost and greatest value-added service). In order to do this, efficiency must be executed at a certain time-opportunity.

In conclusion, the Logistical Cycle must be synchronized with the tempo of military operations.

The logistical system is the one that allows to comply with the logistical support to the military instrument. It is mainly composed of entities and specialized units that carry out logistical responsibilities within or subject to the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, General Staff, Theater Command, Subordinate Command and Tactical Command.

When there is more than one Theater of Operations, military strategy will set priorities as to the allotment of resources for each of them.

**MODULARITY**

The Argentine Armed Forces have the challenge to find the proper modular transformation that allows to have expeditionary forces of quality to defend, together with their allies, broad interests of the nation and the Latin American region.

A modular organization is the one that has a great response capability, it is simple, flexible and adaptable. This concept of Modular Logistical Force is based on logistical modules which may be structured and interchanged, if required, properly determining the necessary supply for the fulfillment of the mission and, therefore, avoiding stock. The logistical design of the theater may be prepared in modules to support any phase of the campaign.

In order to reach these objectives, current forces must be reorganized in such a way that any operational commander can have logistical forces that may support the reaction of great deployable capability, for example, the Rapid Deployment Force of the Argentine Army in such a large national territory.

A logistical structure that provides command unit from the strategic level to the fox hole of a soldier is the initial point for the construction of this system.

The defensive strategy of Argentina, as the eighth largest country in the world, requires a logistical system that can be integrated into a joint logistical system. This must be built up under a modular logistical concept, integrated for command and control, but structured over Logistical Support Basis for the land component, a modern logistical system of the naval component and another that is of their own for the air component of the theater.

Other organizations should respond to structures of specific or joint nature if required and which are the result.
of a territory preparation such as the Logistical Support Regional Center. These are organizations at the operational level of war that should facilitate the logistical command and control, sustainment brigade operations (that have organic logistical elements), they should not have a fixed organization and should be structured based on a mission with the possibility to fit regions or geographical areas of the country.

In the territorial Argentine maritime area, besides the self-sustaining own logistics that features the fleet in operations, there should be a system of basis and naval workshops that allow to sustain operations of the surface fleet in terms of logistics, submarine forces, naval aviation systems and naval infantry in the Argentine Sea.

The largest sovereign responsibility, at national level, is the air space area. It requires basis and centers that need a logistical system support that is extremely expensive, particular, sensitive and devoted to sustain air operations in an increasingly complex operational area.

Even though Argentina has not an offensive global strategy, this does not mean that its forces do not have an important planning capacity. Actually, requirements of peacekeeping forces generation that are currently deployed in Haiti or Cyprus, clearly show the requirement to have joint logistical resources that are proper to inter-operate with the Latin American allies.

The ideal situation would be to have a joint expeditionary modular logistical force with planning capacity of, at least, one joint tasks force/brigade, in any point in Latin America in order to reach the proper regional inter-operability logistical capacity.

**Logistical Design**

At operational level, logistical organizations of the Argentine Armed Forces are, in principle, joint but they require keeping certain characteristics of the force they support and they are structured according to the mission.

For this reason, logistical organizations at this level must have planning based on a logistical design with a high flexibility and prediction degree.

In spite of the importance of the joint military action, it is necessary to highlight what the current joint logistical doctrine establishes: each armed force (Army-Navy and Air Force) is responsible for the logistical support of its own elements, even when it is part of a joint command.

The logistical design at operational level may be centralized, decentralized or mixed.

- **Centralized logistical design:** The Commander of the Theater delegates the logistical command of the campaign to a Logistical Commander of the Theater of Operations. Generally, a Joint Logistic Support Regional Center is organized and composed of staff and means of the three armed forces that sustain the operations of the theater integrating the logistics of the operational level with the tactical elements.

- **Decentralized logistical design:** There is a directly available Joint Logistical Center for the Commander of the Theater. This center synchronizes logistical operations and keeps him updated as to the information about the logistical status of the forces available. However, logistical organizations of each force are separated and sustain the logistical flow from the military strategy through specific channels and feed tactical operations that each component requires.

- **Mixed logistical design:** This is a combination of the previous ones and is frequently the most used.

It is worth mentioning that in the centralized design, the

---

Commander of the Theater does not delegate responsibility at any time and only delegates part of the authority to another commander called Logistical Commander of the Theater who is a commander from the same level of the Component’s Command subject to him and who will only command logistical operations of the forces appointed to the Theater of Operations.

**Logistical Planning**

In about 700 b.C., Assyrians developed the first regular army in living memory. In order to move a force of 500,000 men, they had to plan a great organization to supply such a great number of troops in the desert and in mountains.

The expression “to live, it is necessary to move” was coined during this age. In fact, if commanders did not take some logistical support with them, they got supplies from the territories they conquered. This concept is still current.

**When training commanders, it is generally said that a proper knowledge of strategy allows to know how to do something and a proper management of logistics gives the possibility to do something.**

However, after the First World War, a new era started due to the high consumption of ammunitions and the expansion of transport and, thus, *an army in movement was more difficult to be supplied*. Operational logistics tries to summarize by means of estimations the certainty grounds that will determine whether it is possible and acceptable to carry out a military campaign. If resources are not enough, an operational pause or planning another campaign will be necessary.

There is sometimes some confusion and logistics is only associated with material logistics. It is important to remember that the areas of staff, material and finance have to be involved in the military logistics.

However, according to the Material Joint Logistics Doctrine, which is currently under revision, this is about the logistical planning of materials of the armed forces at the following stages:

1) Preparation of general plan
2) Development of general plan
3) Guidelines, plans and orders

Currently, it may be seen that the approach to the logistics problem is not to be dealt with in stages, but in an integral way and from the start of the planning. There should only be two logistical planning categories:

- **Logistical planning**: It responds to the initial planning process of the commander and is used during the very development of the modes of action in order to determine
feasibility and to know the restrictions of the campaign immediately after the step of planning confrontation. This will be the start of the logistical cycle to determine requirements.

Planning for logistical support: It follows the conclusions and decisions of the Commander that are made during the logistical planning and it develops the execution details for the logistical structure and systems.

While each type of planning responds to different purposes, both are necessary parts of the effort for planning at each conduction level. Actually, a great part of the planning effort in both categories takes place simultaneously.

Currently, it is more frequent to talk about operations process and planning is part of it. Operations process can be summarized in the basic activities of conduction: Planning, Organization, Direction, Coordination and Supervision-Control. Other armed forces just call them in this way: Preparation, Planning, Execution and Supervision.

The operational level is a level that translates strategy into tactics. Therefore, it is highly important to understand and identify the right problem before starting planning.

In order to identify the problem, it is usual to use, nowadays, the concepts of operational design from which a planning guideline will be derived in order to guide the operational approach and the concept of the operation to be developed.

It is convenient for the process of common planning to be used at operational level to include logistics together with operations and intelligence since the beginning at all stages and in a holistic way.

A proposed method for a logistical planning process may include:

1) Identification of the problem (this includes the logistical point of view)
2) Preparation and analysis of modes of action and enemy capacities (this includes the logistical point of view)
3) Confrontation (from which restrictions and initial requirements will be determined)
4) Comparison
5) Resolution (this derives from the determination of requirements and beginning of the logistical support planning for the campaign. Once the decision has been adopted and the commander does not have support, risk is taken. Risk analysis must always be carried out, the important thing is that the commander gets to know how much risk they can take).
6) Development and distribution of plans
7) Supervision

In spite of the importance of the joint military action, it is necessary to highlight what the current joint logistical doctrine establishes: each armed force is responsible for the logistical support of its own elements, even when it is part of a joint command.

These stages are part of a method proposed in which there is the idea of stating the logistical problem from the beginning in the method of operational level planning and this method must be implemented in a recurrent way and permanently updated.

Modern logistical planning must aim at being completely digital with an updated database and with the capacity to inform about the situation of the force in real or almost real time to the military commander.

Current military logistics is integral and it is in a permanent process of adaptation and transformation requiring proper technology and management of administration concepts of the supply chain.

THE OPERATIONAL REACH

The Andes Army will always have the glory to say: we have carried out the campaign in twenty-four days, we went through the highest mountains in the world, we defeated the tyrants and gave freedom to Chile.

General José de San Martín
Report of the Chacabuco Battle to the Supreme Director
Santiago de Chile, February 28, 1817.

In this battle report, distance and time to cross the Andes show the concept of operational scope of the forces of the Liberation Campaign. It took many years for San Martín to train forces in Mendoza before crossing to Chile, which explains to us the logistical principle of predictability.

Plans took into consideration the loss of cattle when crossing the mountains and, in fact, half of the cattle were...

2. Thompson, Julian; La savia de la Guerra. La Logística del Conflicto Armado; Instituto de Publicaciones Navales; Buenos Aires; 1991; pages 45 – 90
lost. However, they reached Chacabuco in proper conditions to fight the battle and could defeat the royalists.

This concept is current and the current operational logistics must be organized with a systemic approach in time and space according to the mission.

The operational scope is an element of operational design that may be used to determine the capacity to act within a distance that is compatible with magnitude and support of the force in order to get decisive points.

This capacity is directly related to logistics and will be subject to the way to address the opponent’s gravity center and to the operational pauses that are imposed based on the evolution of the culminating point.

Another important aspect of operational logistics is the transport capacity required for the deployment in operations. It is usually said that any logistical problem is a transport problem.

In the case of the Argentine Armed Forces, at military strategic level, transport is centralized and provided by the Joint Transport Command of the Armed Forces to take personnel and means from the basis to the Theater of Operations.

According to the logistical design of the theater, there may be a Joint Transport Command of the Theater or, in the framework of the joint staff of the theater, the logistical area of the logistical officer will appoint a transport officer that synchronizes operations of the specific land, air and naval transport commands as well as for civil means and other agencies to be transported.

From the analysis of this aspect, we can state the priority to have, in the short term, a National Defense Mobilization Law. That is to translate its execution body into the creation of a General Direction for Mobilization at military strategic level that directly reports to the Ministry of Defense as this will make it possible for the requirements stated in the plans to be met by means of the transformation of the national potential into real power.

CONCLUSIONS

If men and military equipment are the vehicle to apply the necessary force in order to win a war, logistics is the engine and fuel that power them.

Only those forces that actually have the capacity to carry out operations sustained at the end of a long communications line would be the ones that are, at least, useful for deterrence regarding new threats in the international setting.

Joint Logistical Design must adapt to the operational environment and terrain and must generate the necessary modular material, staff and finance forces for the fulfillment of the mission.

It is key to know the logistics of the three armed forces in general and of each of them in particular according to their positions and responsibilities.

Proper and detailed planning is vital and gives some certainty to an uncertain environment.

Operational logistics subjects the limits of the campaign joining the strategic logistical flow with the tactical logistical one extending from interior and communications areas to tactical logistical basis.

The challenge of military commanders is to be able to execute the operational maneuver ad, at the same time, control and extend logistical conditioning. If this is not possible, they must know the risk to be taken.

The Malvinas lesson has shown the importance to have proper logistics and of the joint military action. This lesson has already been taught and mistakes have been paid with the lives of heroes. The important thing is for the Argentine Armed Forces and their allies to have taken and understood it. This will reinforce the idea of training to win.

Leonardo Arcadio Zarza
Lieutenant Colonel of Field Artillery and Army Aviator, Bachelor in Strategy and Organization, General Staff Officer of the Argentine Army and the United States Army. He was Deputy Commander of the Joint Engineers Company Kosovo 4 within the framework of NATO in the year 2002. He graduated from the Escuela Superior de Guerra Conjunta de las Fuerzas Armadas. He holds a degree in law and Master in National Defense in Argentina. He also holds a Master, in Business from the University of Kansas, United States; in Logistics from the United States Army and in Arts and Military Science from the United States Army Command and General Staff College. He was Commander of the Air Intelligence Squadron 601. He is military professor at the Escuela Superior de Guerra and Commander of the Combat Support Aviation Battalion 601.

Current military logistics is integral and it is in a permanent process of adaptation and transformation requiring proper technology and handling concepts of supply chain management.

5. Thompson, Julian; op. cit.; p. 242.
6. Thompson, Julian; op. cit.; p. 428.
THE ART OF NEGOTIATION

The applicability of negotiation in military training will allow to train armed men in different procedures and skills to achieve successful results before arriving to a conflict.

By Julián Ernesto Sccaso Losa

IMPORTANCE

Negotiation is a permanent activity that is inherent to the human being and is a means to get his interests. However, human history has been full of irrational violence in which the use and management of negotiation was not frequent.

Negotiation is one of the most used alternative dispute resolution methods to solve a problem in a peaceful way and, also, to reach interests or purposes in an efficient manner as nobody negotiates to lose or resign interests but because they seek them in the best and least expensive manner.

As the exercise of violence is closely related to the ultimate purpose of the mission of the military instrument, it is possible to make the mistake to think that “armed men” cannot negotiate or, rather, that they can only do this in the framework of a peacekeeping operation under a mandate of the United Nations Organization or similar organizations.

The idea that negotiating implies some loss of authority as it is necessary to give or make concessions to an opposing actor, whether internal or external, plus the idea that negotiation may be confronted with discipline, are evidence for said mistake.

The concept that “military men do not negotiate” is derived from the scarce knowledge that there is in the military environment about this discipline. This is why the purpose of this article is to give some elements to how that negotiation is present in the military profession.

Negotiation is another tool to solve conflicts. We are permanently negotiating, for example, when selling or buying goods, when trying to solve a family or work conflict, when

1. Alternative dispute resolution methods are pre-judicial mechanisms, whether formal or informal, that parties have to resolve a conflict in a peaceful way. Some of them are negotiation, mediation, arbitration and settlement.
exchanging opinions with a fellow on how to carry out a certain activity or when coordinating and carrying out activities with agencies outside the Armed Forces.

The secret to be successful in some critical situations is how to and when to negotiate.

**A TOOL FOR MILITARY APPLICATION**

One of the first questions that arise when getting into the study of this discipline is whether negotiation is a tool for military application and whether it may be used during the development of missions appointed to the Military Instrument of the Nation.

The answer is clearly yes. It is enough to read publications specialized in the military problem to discover how the main powers involved in the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan have suffered serious consequences as they did not properly train their troops in this discipline since the beginning of both conflicts.

Some studies carried out by the Department of Defense of the United States in light of these events have concluded that:

- The American military’s mission in Iraq requires a set of skills and outcomes that are very different than the traditional war fighting for which soldiers are trained. These include negotiation, a common enough human activity that, in the context of military operations in places like Iraq, takes on new complexity, importance, and urgency.

---

*If a soldier does not know how to use a gun in the battlefield, he will be a dead man. If only one inexperienced peacekeeper isolated in a remote control post does not know how to negotiate, he can risk a complete peace operation and there will be many dead men.*

Department of Peacekeeping Operation

The previous statements led the US Armed Forces to implement several training courses in negotiation not only before deployment in Theaters of Operations, but also at military training and specialization institutes. Some examples of this are the research and training programs at the West Point Military Academy that belongs to the Army or the Air Force Negotiation Center of Excellence.

It is fair to mention that the Armed Forces from the United Kingdom and Canada have recognized this problem and adopted similar measures.

Moreover, it is important to remember that both in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are not only combat operations against the rebels, but there are also operations for stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction.
which, in general, are similar to a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation of the United Nations 3.

At this point, it is useful to point out one of the main experiences obtained during the development of this type of operations in Iraq which highlight the importance of this activity:

Negotiations are sometimes the last chance to prevent some situations from turning lethal and to solve problems in a way that poses less risk of losing American lives or creating more enemies than the tactical objective is worth 4.

THE MISSION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND NEGOTIATION

The participation of our Armed Forces in Peacekeeping Operations strengthens the idea that Argentine military men must know the current methods and techniques for negotiation as this will contribute to improve their professional performance in this type of operations.

However, a detailed analysis of the mission imposed to the Military Instrument will provide with more solid grounds for this statement.

The Guidelines for the Organization and Functions of the Armed Forces establish that the Military Instrument of the Argentine Republic will have the mission to join forces and repel any state military external aggression in order to guarantee and save in a permanent way vital interests of the Nation, which are sovereignty, independence and self-determination, territorial integration and the life and freedom of its inhabitants, it may also take part in:

- United Nations multi-lateral operations
- Interior security operations as established in Interior Security Law No. 24059
- Operations to support the national community or friendly countries
- The building of a Sub regional Defense System

As it can be observed, missions expressed do not consider the use of the Armed Forces in international contexts such

Negotiation is one of the most used alternative dispute resolution methods to solve a problem in a peaceful way and, also, to reach interests or purposes in an efficient manner as nobody negotiates to lose or resign interests but because they seek them in the best and least expensive manner.

as Iraq or Afghanistan. When making a detailed analysis of complementary missions, we can conclude that possible scenarios in which members of the Forces will perform their responsibilities will be complex and critical.

In this sense, said scenarios could have all or some of the following characteristics:

- Execution of a broad series of operations that range from basic tactics to those related with Civic-Military Cooperation and which may take place in the nation and in other countries of the region or outside the region (for example: Haiti).
- Complex operational environments 5 in permanent evolution and urbanized except for large “empty spaces” (for example: Patagonia, Puna).
- Participation of multiple actors, both military and civilian, whether national or foreign and, in some cases, international agencies (for example: International Committee of the Red Cross).
- Massive participation of civil population as:
- Part of the conflict
- Victim of the conflict
- Affected by natural disasters
- Protection of civil population by means of efforts to protect it from the aftermath of the armed conflict or natural disasters.
- Minor actions with participation of military personnel which may have strategic consequences.

When considering the characteristics mentioned for the possible scenarios and the relevance of missions appointed to the Argentine Military Instrument, it is easy to imagine countless conflict situations in which violence will be the last resource to be used and the least beneficial.

In this context, it will be possible to appreciate the capacity of troops to solve critical situations and, as it has happened in Iraq, during operations carried out by American Forces, negotiation will have tactical importance, operational significance and strategic implications 6.
The method implies the use of five different negotiation strategies: competitive, collaborating, accommodating, avoidance and compromising (graphic No. 1).

It is worth mentioning that negotiation strategies must be planned and cannot be used in an arbitrary and intuitive manner. In order to determine them, we will have to take into consideration the following factors:

- The critical situation
- The personality of the opposing negotiator
- The cultural context in which the process is developed
- Time available
- What alternatives to negotiation exist which may allow to reach the purposes set if they decide not to negotiate

The latter item is essential as it will determine how flexible the strategy to be followed may be because in case the alternative to negotiation allows to reach the purposes set, it may be decided not to relinquish anything or, directly, not to negotiate. On the other hand, if this alternative to the agreement is weak, it may be necessary to consider what aspects to relinquish during negotiation.

**Competitive negotiation**

The negotiator will give preference to the result of the negotiation rather than to the relation. Therefore, techniques used will seek to achieve the purpose set before the other party does that. This style may be characterized as aggressive and anticipatory.

This form of negotiation is used in situations in which the item or value in dispute or, also, the purpose cannot be

---

**The participation of our Armed Forces in Peacekeeping Operations strengthens the idea that Argentine military men must know the current methods and techniques for negotiation as this will contribute to improve their professional performance in this type of operations.**

**HOW AND WHEN TO NEGOTIATE**

As introduction to the art of negotiation, some concepts will be developed as regards this discipline for the purpose of modifying those that allow to integrate negotiation with military activity.

First, before getting to know how and when to negotiate, it is necessary to adopt a negotiation method that guides actions to be followed and provides with strategies and techniques necessary to plan, solve and exploit in an efficient manner critical situations in complex scenarios.

The method that is currently used in several areas in which conflict is permanent and which best adapts to military activity due to its characteristics is the method called situational negotiation.

This method, based on the principle of collaborative negotiation, establishes that the negotiator may use different strategies during the process taking into account the characteristics of the situation to be solved and that the critical point of the process focuses on:

- The relation with the other negotiator
- The elements of the context
- The level of opposition of the interests at stake

The method gives flexibility and freedom of action during the whole process allowing to correct its way in case it is not possible to advance or in case of regression.

**NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES**

These are different modes that a negotiator will adopt when confronted with his counterpart. The purposes may be:

1. To influence his counterpart and reach the goals set for negotiation
2. Delay it
3. Reject it

His selection must always be driven by the purpose to be preserved or achieved. These strategies vary basically depending on two menacing factors: the importance of the purpose to be kept or achieved and the value given to the relationship with the counterpart, whether the counterpart is a person, institution or country.

**GRAPHIC NO. 1: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES**

Source: Ponti, Franc; Los caminos de la negociación; Ediciones Gráficas S.A.; Barcelona; 2005, p. 118.

---

The participation of our Armed Forces in Peacekeeping Operations strengthens the idea that Argentine military men must know the current methods and techniques for negotiation as this will contribute to improve their professional performance in this type of operations.
divided or is not imperative. This is the main form used by those who negotiate a zero-sum mind (win/lose).

**Collaborative negotiation**

In this type of negotiation, the one that struggles to defend his interests is aware of the fact that in order to achieve his goals and keep a very good relation with the opposing party, it is important for both parties to win.

This strategy, in many occasions, allows to get a favourable result of greater proportions than the one set at the beginning due to the fact that when keeping an excellent relation with the other negotiator, it may be possible to deal with topics that were not included in the initial agenda. This is called “to expand the pie”.

In this process, there is a variable sum mind which is known, in the conflict jargon, as win/win and allows to make concessions for the purpose of reaching the purpose set.

**Compromising negotiation**

In some occasions, when negotiators do not have enough time or the proper resources to develop the negotiation process, they may reach an agreement that allows them to reach their purposes, whether totally or partially, without the need to negotiate deeply. This action is the characteristic of the compromising negotiation style which must not be confused with collaborative negotiation as it is not based on the good relation among parties, but it focuses on reaching an agreement that is as fair and rapid as possible.

A valid example of this is the appointment of responsibilities among representatives of different agencies in case of emergency, such as fire or explosion, in which the priority is to mitigate the disaster rather than individual will or professional ego.

**Accommodating negotiation**

When the relation with the opposing party is more important than the result of the negotiation in itself, the person taking part in it may sacrifice, totally or partially, his personal interests in order to benefit his opposing party (lose/win).

This style may also be used within the framework of speculative negotiation as it will aim at relinquishing something today in order to get a greater benefit in the near future.

This style is generally adopted when interests or purposes to be negotiated in the near future are more important than those at stake at that moment.

**Avoidance negotiation**

This will be used when there is no real intention to negotiate or when doing so is not profitable for our own interests.

This style implies rejecting negotiation in a calculated and methodic manner but it will be necessary to take into account that this may affect the relation with the other party, even more when interests in dispute are of great importance for the other party.

Moreover, they may reject to negotiate when said process is considered to worsen the existing conflict in which both parties would see the integrity of their interests affected (to avoid lose/lose) and when the parties consider they will be in a better position to face this process in the near future.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The battlefield that is the main feature of the last decade armed conflicts is a highly complex and volatile setting that is permanently changing. This change and the need to properly exploit the result of tactical actions require military men to dominate some skills that do not have a strictly military feature and negotiation is one of them.

In this situation, missions appointed to the Argentine Military Instrument will also develop in settings of similar complexity as the characteristics of said missions will face us with a great variety of actors and, therefore, a great number of problems that will mostly require non-violent solutions.

In light of this reality, it is necessary for men and women of the Armed Forces to have pertinent tools and training to reach success.

Accordingly, we can conclude that teaching this discipline should be important in military training and contents should be adapted to the different stages of the process depending on the needs of each position.

Considering its teaching in the curricula, apart from having criteria and good judgment, will allow to professionally solve critical situations with proper specific knowledge. And this is something that we, as war professionals, should be prepared to do.

> REFEREED ARTICLE

Julían Ernesto Sccasso Losa

Argentine Army Major. Staff Officer. He holds a degree in Strategy and Organization. In June/December, 2009 he was instructor of the Negotiation course at the Peacekeeping Operations Training Center (CIOpAZ, in its Portuguese acronym) of the Brazilian Army. He took the course on Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution at the Peace Operation Training Institute. He is currently taking the course on Joint Military Planning and Staff at the Joint Staff College.
PROTOCOL ON EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR

Argentina is High Contracting Party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons which establishes, in its Protocol V, the obligation to take all necessary actions in order to instruct the Armed Forces of a country with the purpose of guaranteeing strict compliance with the explicit and implicit obligations stated.

By Carlos Nielsen Enemark

BACKGROUND
Within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons held in Geneva between November 27 and 28, 2003, the Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War was signed. This was the first multilateral agreement on this issue.

During this Meeting, obligations and best practices for clearance of explosive remnants of war were established. These remnants are: ordnance that has failed to explode, abandoned explosive ordnance, different mines, booby traps and other devices that threaten the lives of people and Peace Forces, of which civil and military personnel are part, after the cessation of hostile activities.

PURPOSE
The Protocol recognizes the serious post-conflict humanitarian problems caused by explosive remnants of war and establishes, as stated in Article 9 and Part 3 of the Technical Annex, generic preventive measures to minimize the occurrence of cases, effects and risks of explosive remnants of war.

KEY PROVISIONS
The Contracting Parties to Protocol V that become actors in an armed conflict shall bear the responsibilities with respect to all explosive remnants of war in territory under their control.

After the cessation of hostile activities and where feasible, the Contracting Party and party to an armed conflict shall facilitate the marking and clearance, removal or destruction of explosive remnants in affected territories under its control.

Contracting Parties shall to the maximum extent possible record and retain information on the use of explosive ordnance and provide relevant information to the party in control of the affected territories.

Contracting parties shall take all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population from the risks of explosive remnants of war.

Each Contracting Party shall provide assistance to other states and organizations for the clearance, removal and destruction of explosive remnants of war.

EFFECTIVE DATE
According to Article 5, paragraph 3 of the Convention, Protocol V became effective on November 12, 2006.

Pursuant to Law No. 26625 dated August, 2010, the Argentine Republic has ratified Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, which is in force since April 7, 2012.

IMPLEMENTATION FOR ARMED FORCES
It is worth mentioning the importance that Article 11 of Protocol V, “Compliance”, has for the Armed Forces as it states the following obligation:

Each High Contracting Party shall require that its armed forces and relevant agencies or departments issue
appropriate instructions and operating procedures and that its personnel receive training consistent with the relevant provisions of this Protocol.

This responsibility, which seems to be simple in its explicit aspects, is huge and complex in its implicit scope. This is the reason why it is possible to see an intense activity in the initial stage for its implementation.

The high professional level and sense of responsibility of our personnel will allow to comply the new obligations stated in an efficient, deep and precise way showing that experience acquired in the international context has been duly consolidated.

Carlos Nielsen Enemark
Retired Captain. He holds a Degree in Navy Marines Systems. He is former Director of the Humanitarian Demining Office of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces. He has been Advisor for demining tasks in Malvinas. He has also been Advisor for the International Security Direction of the Ministry of Defense for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Anti-personnel Landmines Convention. He is currently taking a post-graduate course on International Security, Disarmament and Weapons Control at NPS Global Foundation.

> REFEREEED ARTICLE
INSitutional ACTivitIes

seminar on cyber defense

In September, students and higher officers of this Institute took part in this Seminar. The topics focused on international situation, regulations, doctrine at military-strategic level and possible scenarios of cyber war and cyber security.

Case Workshop

According to the statements made for the Curriculum of the Specialization in Operational Strategy and Joint Planning, as from October and for five weeks, the Case Workshop “CHOIQUE V” military exercise was carried out.

This exercise aims at training military staff by promoting interoperability among the three forces. The relation sought was shown by the following dynamics: the Joint Staff College prepared the Campaign Plan and the Colleges of each force made the Operations Plans that contribute to the Campaign Plan.

seminar on energy

This seminar took place in October. The purpose of it was the study of predictions from the point of view of the defense. The pillars of this Seminar were: strengthening the energy sector and training the capacity to shape complex realities of this key sector of the economy.

Our foreign students

Colonel Augusto Cesar Amaral (Brazilian Air Force)
Colonel Paulo Alípio Branco Valença (Brazilian Army)

As Higher Officers of the Brazilian Armed Forces, we can say that having studied at the Joint Staff College has been a great professional opportunity, especially because of the close spirit that joins Argentina and Brazil. Also, there is a great close relationship between our Armed Forces and it is important to strengthen the Peace Zone that is South America as promoted by the South American Defense Council.

The Education Center of the Armed Forces is, for us, an example of a consolidated mindset of joint work of three singular forces and is of reference for several armed institutions in the continent.

In this sense, the Ministry of Defense of Brazil understands the curriculum and teaching excellence of the Master’s Degree in Joint Strategy and Strategic Level Conduction, highlighting it as one of the institutions for officers of the Brazilian Armed Forces to train themselves in the art of Military Strategy and topics related to International Relations, Geopolitics and Defense.

Qualified professionals and experts in their areas of teaching, as part of a curriculum, allowed us to get proper training which we will apply when taking different functions back home. Also, it has been a pleasure to be able to work with motivated military men and civilians who are committed to their constitutional responsibilities.

We would also like to highlight the typical hospitality of the Argentine people which we could see in the faculty and our classmates.

We visited several military and civil institutions of historical and cultural relevance in the City of Buenos Aires and the interior of the country. This allowed us to expand our knowledge of geography, economy and psycho-social aspects.

Getting to know Argentina, its Armed Forces, the people, culture and their features has been an unforgettable experience.

We come back to our country with greater skills and energy after our stay in the Argentine Republic.

We, therefore, express our gratitude. Muito Obrigado!
RULES FOR COLLABORATION
WITH THE VISIÓN CONJUNTA JOURNAL

COLLABORATION
The journal of the Escuela Superior de Guerra Conjunta is of public release and, in any case, the Direction of the journal reserves the right to publish collaboration.

Articles may refer to opinions, research results, translations and reviews or comments to articles or any other source of consultation.

Once material is edited, it is protected by the provisions specified in the Intellectual Property Law No. 11723. Partial or total reproduction of articles is hereby authorized provided author and source are mentioned.

PRESENTATION REQUIREMENTS
The requirements are specified on the website (www.esgcffa.mil.ar) and they may also be requested by e-mail to revistaesgc@yahoo.com.ar.

Collaboration will be sent by e-mail or presented with the following information: name and surname, a brief CV, address, e-mail address and contact telephone.

Collaboration must be addressed to the Editorial Secretary of the Visión Conjunta journal:
Pedro Jofré. Secretaría de Extensión, Escuela Superior de Guerra Conjunta de las Fuerzas Armadas. Av. Luis María Campos 480, 2º piso C1426BOP, CABA. e-mail address: revistaesgc@yahoo.com.ar

We acknowledge and thank the valuable cooperation of all those who support the project of Visión Conjunta. The digital version of Visión Conjunta is available on www.esgcffa.mil.ar and an English version will be available as from this version.

DESCRIPTION OF THE DISTINCTIVE COAT OF ARMS AND HERALDIC MEANING

In the center, there is the emblem of the Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas.

The background has a chess that shows the Military Art in white and light blue, the colours of the Argentine flag. Blue means justice, enthusiasm, loyalty and truth; and white means purity, integrity, obedience, firmness, surveillance and eloquence.
MISSION

“To train students in the exercise of conducting at Operational Strategic level and in the development of the functions of the Chiefs of Staff at the Operational Strategic and Military Strategic levels in the framework of joint and joint- combined actions in order to optimize the use of military instrument of the Nation and to train professionals interested in National Defense through the development of post-degree education courses, research projects and outreach activities”.

For this purpose, the Escuela Superior de Guerra Conjunta offers post-degree courses in two levels:

**LEVEL 1:** To be taken by Chief Officers of the Argentine Armed Forces and officers from other countries with the rank of major or equivalent.

**LEVEL 2:** To be taken by Superior Officers and Chiefs of the Argentine Armed Forces and officers and chiefs from other countries with the rank of Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel or equivalent.

VISION

The Escuela Superior de Guerra Conjunta will be the highest level military academic institute for the training of Superior Military Staff from Argentina and other countries as well as college graduates as to knowledge and skills related to National Defense.